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RACIALLY INTEGRATED EDUCATION AND
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT*
CHINH Q. LE**
When it comes to racial and ethnic integration in our nation's public
schools, it matters significantly whether the federal government is
friend or foe. This has always been the case, but it is particularly so
now. More than three decades have passed since the last major
federal initiative to promote school integration. Meanwhile, courts
in recent years have substantially curtailed the remedies that can be
achieved through school desegregation litigation and applied
increasingly narrow interpretations to laws that once allowed
private litigants to supplement federal government enforcement of
civil rights. As a result, American public schools have witnessed two
decades of resegregation and are more segregated today than they
have been in over forty years. Forty percent of Latino students and
nearly that same percentage of Black students attended intensely
segregated schools, where ninety to one hundred percent of the
population is non-White. What is more, the relationship between
race and poverty continues to run deep: forty percent of Black and
Latino students also attend schools of concentrated poverty, where
seventy to one hundred percent of the children are poor. By
contrast, only about one in thirty White students attend such
schools.
This Article takes a look back at the role that the federal
government has played with regard to issues of school integration
and school desegregation to see how history can inform what a new
administration in Washington could do to reinvigorate the cause
and advance the goal of racially integrated education. After briefly
reviewing the role of the federal legislative and executive
branches-in initially facilitating school desegregation and then, for
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most of the past four decades, withdrawing from the gains made-
this Article offers recommendations to the Obama administration
for future actions. Beyond presidential leadership, the Article
focuses primarily on the promise and potential of three federal
entities: the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
the Office for Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Education,
and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. It suggests both an
intentional, tailored effort to develop integration-maximizing
strategies to deal with the government's existing school
desegregation docket, as well as an affirmative, multi-pronged effort
to advance voluntary school integration initiatives, broadly defined.
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INTRODUCTION
As with most issues implicating public policy on a grand scale,
when it comes to racial and ethnic integration in our nation's public
schools, it matters significantly whether the federal government is
friend or foe. This has always been the case, but it is particularly so
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now. More than three decades have passed since the last major
federal initiative to promote school integration.' Meanwhile, courts in
recent years have applied increasingly narrow interpretations to laws
that once allowed private litigants and other entities to supplement
federal government enforcement of civil rights.2 Indeed, in light of
Alexander v. Sandoval,3 private litigants may no longer bring
disparate impact actions under the implementing regulations of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 a substantial shift in the law that
has thrown into question long presumed private rights of action for
such claims under various other federal statutes, too.
5
Specifically with regard to the provision of equal, integrated,
quality public education, here, in a nutshell, is where the nation
stands: the Federal Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental
right to education,6 let alone an equal or desegregated education.7
1. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT/PROYECTO
DERECHOS CIVILES (UCLA), HISTORIC REVERSALS: ACCELERATING
RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 6, n.13 (2007)
[hereinafter HISTORIC REVERSALS], available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/deseg/reversalsjreseg-need.pdf (describing the Emergency School Aid Act of
1972 as "[t]he last positive legislation" on the issue).
2. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-52 (2009) (heightening the
otherwise liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the initial proof required to allege a claim of supervisory liability for intentional
unconstitutional discrimination); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,
623-32 (2007) (adopting a narrow reading of the time period afforded to private litigants
to enforce Title VII equal-pay rights), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-12, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d), and other scattered sections); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment precludes state employees
from suing their employers to recover money damages for discrimination in violation of
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
66-67 (2000) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment precludes state employees from
suing their employers in federal court for money damages under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967).
3. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
4. Id. at 293.
5. See, e.g., John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implications
for Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1641-48 (2002) (raising the
concern that Sandoval could be applied more broadly to call into question Congress's
ability under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe state action with
disparate impact on protected classes). But see, e.g., Sam Spital, Note, Restoring Brown's
Promise of Equality After Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We Can't Wait, 19 HARV.
BLACKLETrER L.J. 93, 111-20 (2003) (arguing that private litigants may still be able to
bring disparate impact claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Bradford C. Mank, Using Section
1983 to Enforce Title V's Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 323-24 (2001)
(exploring possibility of same).
6. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Although
there is no fundamental right to education, states may not outright exclude
undocumented, non-citizen children from access to free public education. Plyler v. Doe,
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School districts or states once subject to court-ordered desegregation
may emerge from their long history of de jure acts after just a few
years of reasonable compliance with formal orders, even if the
compliance resulted in only nominal desegregation.' And even
voluntary efforts to provide some modicum of racial and ethnic
integration, once encouraged by the courts, are now constitutionally
suspect.' In other words, at least for the time being, the courts are at
best only loosely enforcing (and hardly expanding) education rights,
so executive and congressional leadership is sorely needed if we as a
nation are going to realize the ideals articulated in Brown v. Board of
Education" more than a half century ago.
And these times demand leadership. In the most recent of a
series of reports by the Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles
on the subject, the organization's co-director, Gary Orfield, tells us
American public schools have witnessed two consecutive decades of
resegregation and are more segregated today than they have been in
over forty years." Even though public school enrollment overall is
more racially and ethnically diverse than ever, this diversity has failed
to translate into diverse schools. Instead, severe racial isolation
remains commonplace. In the academic year spanning 2006-2007,
forty percent of Latino students and nearly that same percentage of
457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (holding that undocumented, non-citizens are entitled to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because they are "'person[s]' in any
ordinary sense of that term").
7. It did not take long for the federal government or the courts to arrive at this
conclusion. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (2006)
(" 'Desegregation' means the assignment of students to public schools and within such
schools without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but
'desegregation' shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to
overcome racial imbalance."); § 2000c-6(a) (authorizing the Attorney General to institute
federal suits but stopping short of empowering any federal official or court from issuing
"any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school"); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (finding that school districts are not
required to achieve racial balance in absence of constitutional violation).
8. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 242, 249-50 (1991) (permitting the
release of school districts from court supervision, regardless of continuing racially
segregated enrollment patterns, upon a showing of good faith compliance with
desegregation orders for a reasonable period of time and the elimination of the vestiges of
segregation to the extent practicable).
9. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720-
35, 747-48 (2007) (holding that race-conscious, voluntary school integration plans must
satisfy strict scrutiny and invalidating two such plans).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. GARY ORFIELD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECTIPROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES
(UCLA), REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGE 3, 8 (2009) [hereinafter REVIVING THE GOAL],
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/reviving-the-goal-mlk_2009.pdf.
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Black students attended "intensely segregated schools," where ninety
to one hundred percent of the population is non-White. 12 These
patterns of segregation, once perceived as a largely urban
phenomenon-with almost two out of every three Black and Latino
students in the nation's major cities attending these intensely
segregated schools-have been replicating themselves in the suburbs
as well. 3 And, the relationship between race and poverty continues to
run deep 4: forty percent of Black and Latino students also attend
schools of concentrated poverty, where seventy to one hundred
percent of the children are poor.15 By contrast, only about one in
thirty White students attend such schools.
6
For eight years, the civil rights community did not shy away from
criticizing George W. Bush for the failure of his administration to
place much if any of a priority on promoting racial integration in
public schools. 7 The election of Barack Obama, a former community
organizer and constitutional law professor, not to mention the
nation's first biracial/African American President, has renewed hope
in some that civil rights generally-and issues of educational equity
and integration in particular-will receive greater attention from the
top. One should be only cautiously optimistic, however. If his
experience in office to date is any indication, President Obama's
attention is spread thin across many fronts, with the financial and
credit crisis on the one hand, and the continuing conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan on the other, not to mention his ambitious intentions to
expand and improve health care, stimulate job growth, and "green"
12. Id. at 10-12.
13. See GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECTIPROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES (UCLA), THE LAST HAVE BECOME THE
FIRST: RURAL AND SMALL TOWN AMERICA LEAD THE WAY ON DESEGREGATION 7
(2008), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/lasthavebecomefirst.pdf.
14. See generally GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT
(HARVARD), WHY SEGREGATION MATrERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUITY
(2005), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Why-SegregMatters.pdf
(describing the inextricable link between race and poverty and their impact on educational
opportunities).
15. REVIVING THE GOAL, supra note 11, at 15.
16. Id.
17. See generally CITIZEN'S COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EROSION OF RIGHTS:
DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
(William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE EROSION OF RIGHTS], available at
http://www.americanprogress.orglissues/2007/03/pdf/civil-rightsreport.pdf (criticizing the
administration's civil rights record under President George W. Bush ("Bush II"));
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND, THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION TAKES AIM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK (2003) [hereinafter THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION TAKES AIM], available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/
reports/taking-aim/bush takes aim.pdf (same).
2010] 729
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the nation's energy infrastructure, while at the same time reducing
the federal deficit. It will be incumbent upon civil rights advocates,
therefore, to keep the Obama administration focused on educational
equity. In any event, high expectations are often followed by great
disappointment, so prudence demands tempered expectations, even
in this age of hope.
With that caveat, this Article takes a look back at the role that
the federal government has played with regard to issues of school
integration (or, for most of the past, school desegregation) to see how
history can inform what a new administration in Washington could do
to reinvigorate the cause and advance the goal of racially integrated
education. The school desegregation story that many of us-
especially the lawyers and law students among us-know best is the
one that follows the federal courts' role in implementing the powerful
but all-too vague mandate of Brown.18 But there is a parallel and
interwoven tale that involves the political branches of government
too,19 and the purpose of revisiting that tale is threefold. First, it helps
to explain where the nation currently stands and how it got there.
Second, it serves as a reminder that, as important as the federal
judiciary has been in shaping the opportunities for meaningful racial
and ethnic integration in the nation's public schools, leadership from
the President and Congress has had as much if not more of an impact
on those opportunities than the court decisions. Third, it highlights
the legal and policy tools available and the federal agencies that once
were and may once again become allies to the cause under an
administration that is willing to make integration a priority.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with a brief review
of how the political branches of the federal government have dealt
18. This is, after all, what is described in the constitutional law casebooks, see, e.g.,
WILLIAM COHEN, JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 723-49 (12th ed. 2005); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 487-500, 552-61 (16th ed. 2007), and what makes for a
good short history of the law on school desegregation. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 29, 29-47 (John Charles Boger &
Gary Orfield eds., 2005) [hereinafter SCHOOL RESEGREGATION]; Erica Frankenberg &
Chinh Q. Le, Desegregation, in 1 BATTLEGROUND: SCHOOLS 179, 179-87 (Sandra
Mathison & E. Wayne Ross eds., 2008); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109
YALE L.J. 249, 260-66 (1999).
19. See generally Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the
Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration
Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 146 (2008) (discussing the influence
and role of the executive branch, and particularly the Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Education, in shaping civil rights policies affecting school desegregation).
[Vol. 88
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with issues of school integration and desegregation under the first
nine presidential administrations after Brown. Part II then continues
that inquiry for the past eight years under President George W. Bush.
These first two Parts highlight the most relevant pieces of federal
legislation relating to education and civil rights that Congress has
passed over the past fifty-plus years. To inform recommendations
made in the latter portions of this Article, however, these two Parts
focus in particular on the creation, development, and role of three
federal government entities: (1) the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice; (2) the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") in the
Department of Education, and its predecessor, in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"); and (3) the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights. Finally, Part III contains
recommendations for the current administration. The suggestions
deal both with the federal government's existing school desegregation
docket, as well as longer-term, affirmative strategies to advance
voluntary school integration, broadly defined.
I. 1954 TO 2000
The story of school desegregation, as told through key Supreme
Court decisions, is now familiar. Brown v. Board of Education
declared segregated schools unconstitutional in a short, unanimous,
and powerful opinion by Chief Justice Warren.E" A year later, the
Court issued a second decision in the same case, known as Brown 11,21
famously ordering that desegregation proceed "with all deliberate
speed, 2 2 which for nearly a decade essentially meant with little speed
or urgency at all.23 Then came Green v. County School Board of New
Kent County,24 invalidating ineffective "freedom of choice" plans and
demanding that the vestiges of segregation be removed from every
facet of a school system "root and branch., 25 In 1969, Warren Burger
succeeded Earl Warren as Chief Justice. 6 What followed was the
controversial ruling of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,7 which concluded that courts could, if need be, order
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
22. Id. at 301.
23. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (describing miniscule desegregation
progress made in first ten years after Brown).
24. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
25. Id. at 438, 441.
26. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUcATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 147-49 (2001).
27. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
2010]
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busing to achieve desegregated schools.28 Keyes v. School District No.
1, Denver, Colorado,29 ordered desegregation in the West,30 where
findings of de jure segregation were harder to come by than in the
South; it was also the first notable Supreme Court case involving the
desegregation of Latinos.31
It turned out that Swann was the high water mark and Keyes
arguably the turning point for the Burger Court. From there, it issued
Milliken v. Bradley,32 which held that courts lacked the authority to
order interdistrict remedies in the absence of a finding of an
interdistrict constitutional violation.33 After Milliken, the Supreme
Court dealt with issues of relatively lesser moment over roughly the
next decade and a half,34 not the least of which was the question of
what to afford plaintiff children for whom a desegregative remedy, of
the sort sought in Milliken, was unavailable.3" In the early 1990s, a
divided Rehnquist Court issued three decisions that, taken together,
explained that school desegregation litigation must come to an end
and described-in rough terms-how school districts could achieve
that finality, also known as "unitary status. ' '36 (A school system
attains "unitary status" when a court determines that it has satisfied
its constitutional obligations and dissolves all desegregation orders
28. Id. at 30.
29. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
30. Id. at 213-14.
31. Kristi L. Bowman, Note, The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 DUKE L.J.
1751, 1777-79 (2001).
32. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
33. Id. at 745.
34. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 452-55 (1979) (finding
that evidence that a school board's purposeful and effective maintenance of all-Black
schools gave rise to a prima facie case of intentional discrimination justifying a systemwide
remedy); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977) (holding that if
there was no finding of systemwide liability, a judicial remedy had to be tailored to address
only those schools that had been affected adversely by specific prior de jure acts);
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976) (finding that a district
court exceeded its remedial authority when it required a school district to make annual
readjustments of attendance zones to maintain desegregated facilities).
35. For instance, three years after Milliken, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
again in the same case, this time to address the questions of whether a district court may,
as part of a desegregation decree, order compensatory or remedial educational programs
for schoolchildren subjected to past acts of de jure segregation and whether it can require
state officials responsible for constitutional violations to bear part of the costs of those
programs. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267, 279 (1977) (affirming district
court's order, on remand from Milliken, of remedial and compensatory programs).
36. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100-02 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
490-91 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-50 (1991).
[Vol. 88
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related to that system.)37 Lastly, we come to the 2007 decision of
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1,38 which dealt with school desegregation's cousin, sometimes
dubbed "voluntary integration."39 It held that, in the absence of a
court order, race-conscious student assignment plans to increase
integration or reduce racial isolation that school districts adopt by
choice are subject to strict scrutiny and must comply with various
difficult (but ultimately vague) legal requirements.4"
With that story in the background, let us turn to the impact that
the other two branches of the federal government have had on school
desegregation and integration. With little help from the federal
government, Brown (and Brown II) had almost no immediate effect
on the racial composition of America's schools.41 In 1956, 101
Southern congressmen and senators signed a "Southern Manifesto,"
decrying the Supreme Court's decision and pledging "to use all lawful
means to bring about [its] reversal."42 President Eisenhower himself
failed to express support for school desegregation, and it was
rumored that he "deplored Brown's holding and felt that integration
should move more slowly."43 Nevertheless, in the face of strong
opposition, Eisenhower proposed, and Congress managed to pass, the
Civil Rights Act of 1957," the first piece of civil rights legislation since
Reconstruction. The 1957 Act was primarily designed to ensure that
African Americans could exercise their right to vote.45 But it also
37. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246, 249-50 (stating that a court can release a school
system from its desegregation obligations upon a finding that it complied "in good faith"
with prior court orders and that the vestiges of the prior discrimination have been
eliminated "to the extent practicable").
38. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
39. See, e.g., ANURIMA BHARGAVA, ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHINH Q. LE,
NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC. & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECrPROYECTO
DERECHOS CIVILES (UCLA), STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K-12
SCHOOL INTEGRATION, MANUAL FOR PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND ADVOCATES 5 (2008),
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Stil-Looking-to-the%2OFuture-Int
egrationManual.pdf.
40. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy provided the fifth vote, and his opinion therefore controls the reach of the
Court's holding.
41. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
42. 102 CONG. REC. 4459-60 (1956).
43. Stephen Plass, Exploring the Limits of Executive Civil Rights Policymaking, 61
OKLA. L. REV. 155, 158 & n.10 (2008).
44. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
45. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 754 (Vintage Books
1977) (1975) (describing the voting provisions as the "most important" aspects of the 1957
Civil Rights Act).
2010]
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created a national U.S. Commission on Civil Rights ("Civil Rights
Commission" or "Commission"), assigning it investigatory and
advisory functions (and, importantly, subpoena powers), and
provided for an additional Assistant Attorney General in the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), appointed by the President, who
could focus exclusively on civil rights issues.4 Later that year, the
Attorney General signed an order formally creating a Civil Rights
Division within DOJ, headed by an Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights.47
Despite the existence of that Civil Rights Division, however,
DOJ generally refrained from school desegregation litigation in the
first ten years after Brown, leaving that work to private parties-
mostly lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. ("LDF") and their network of cooperating attorneys
across the South.48 Without help from the federal government, and
with the courts refusing to define "all deliberate speed," Brown's
tenth anniversary was hardly an occasion to celebrate: there had been
some token desegregation in the South, but the main story to date
was one of massive resistance and minimal pressure from the federal
government's three branches.49 By 1964, a tiny fraction of Southern
Blacks-in the range of 1.2 to 2.3%, depending whom you asked and
how you counted it-were attending schools with White students. 0
46. §§ 101-105, 71 Stat. at 634-36 (setting up the Commission); § 111, 71 Stat. at 637
(creating the Assistant Attorney General position). President Truman laid the foundation
for the Commission's creation when he created a fifteen-member Committee on Civil
Rights in 1946. See Jocelyn C. Frye et al., The Rise and Fall of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 452-53 (1987).
47. Exec. Order No. 155-57, 22 Fed. Reg. 10,310 (Dec. 20, 1957); David L. Norman,
The Strange Career of the Civil Rights Division's Commitment to Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 983,
983 n.2 (1984) (citing the order).
48. Norman, supra note 47, at 984.
49. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 78-102 (1979).
50. Compare STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE 105 (1997) ("[I]n the eleven ex-Confederate states .... a mere 1.2%
of black public school students attended schools that had any white pupils at all."),
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND, LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE:
THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION AT 50, at 13 (2007) [hereinafter LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE],
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/long-road/long-road-to-justice.pdf (stating
that 1.2% of Southern Blacks attended schools with Whites), and James R. Dunn, Title VI,
the Guidelines, and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42, 42 & n.3 (1967)
(citing 1.17% of Black students in schools with Whites, with an explanation in the footnote
of how even this percentage is deceptively high), with WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 102
(stating that 2.3% of Southern Blacks attended schools with Whites), and Comment, The
Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321, 322 (1967) (stating
that 2.3% of Southern Blacks were attending desegregated schools).
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Despite President Kennedy's reportedly reluctant commitment to
civil rights,5 his leadership paved the way for the most comprehensive
civil rights legislation the nation had seen in nearly a century. 2 A year
after Kennedy sent it to Congress, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("1964
Act")53 became law, although sadly, it was left to his successor,
President Lyndon B. Johnson, to be signed.54 Remarkable in both
design and scope, the 1964 Act irreversibly enmeshed the federal
government in the law and politics of school desegregation.
Three provisions of the 1964 Act are particularly relevant in this
regard. First, Title IV authorized the Attorney General to initiate
desegregation litigation against school districts and states upon
receipt of a written complaint by aggrieved individuals who could not
pursue the claim on their own for reasons of cost, safety, employment,
or other such concerns.55 Second, Title VI prohibited discrimination
on the basis of race, color, and national origin in federally assisted
programs.56 As applied to public schools, the vast majority of which
received some amount of federal funds,57 it made discrimination not
just illegal but practically and economically difficult by withholding
federal funds from schools that did not comply. Finally, Title XI
authorized the Attorney General to intervene in existing civil rights
lawsuits brought by private parties under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment by certifying that the case is of general
public importance. 8 Several commentators have described the law as
taking a "carrot and stick" approach to civil rights enforcement, with
51. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 65-67 (1990); CHARLES WHALEN &
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 16 (1985).
52. See KLUGER, supra note 45, at 758-59.
53. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
54. See KLUGER, supra note 45, at 759.
55. § 407, 78 Stat. at 248 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (2006)). Title IV
also established federal grants to state and local agencies to assist them in eliminating
school segregation. § 405, 78 Stat. at 247-48 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-4
(2006)).
56. §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. at 252-53 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (2006)); see
also Dunn, supra note 50, at 45-50 (describing the legal framework and background of
Title VI).
57. It was especially true that the majority of public schools received federal funds
after Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 the following
year, which infused more federal dollars into local school systems serving low-income
families and students with special needs. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (2006)).
58. § 902, 78 Stat. at 266 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (2006)).
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the offer of funding for compliant school districts as the carrot, and
litigation against noncompliant ones as the stick.59
Enforcement of Title VI's ban on the use of federal funds for
discriminatory behavior was entrusted to the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") in the first instance.
6
0
HEW was authorized to investigate complaints, conduct compliance
reviews, and initiate enforcement proceedings against school districts
with the possibility of terminating federal funding.6' In exercising
these duties, HEW played a key role in developing legal standards
governing school desegregation. In 1965, it issued implementing
regulations and desegregation guidelines under Title VI.62 Because
these initial guidelines "primarily relied on freedom-of-choice plans
and the good faith efforts of local officials, 63 and did not require any
specific desegregation results, they were not terribly controversial in
the South.6' The following year, however, HEW released more
aggressive revised guidelines that reflected a recognition that freedom
of choice plans were ineffective and demanded actual results.65
Although the second set of guidelines elicited substantial opposition
from Southern leaders, the Supreme Court ultimately gave the
guidelines implicit approval when it invalidated the freedom of choice
plan in Green, and HEW gained legitimacy as a desegregation
enforcement agency that the courts were willing to back.'
59. ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS
AND FEDERAL POLICY IN THE POST-BROWN ERA 4 (1986); see also GARY ORFIELD, THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT 46, 77 (1969) (describing the role of federal funding post-Brown).
60. 29 Fed. Reg. 16,298 (Dec. 4, 1964); General Statement of Policies Under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. pt. 181 (1966); see SALOMONE, supra note 59, at
63; The Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, supra note 50, at 322. For a
more thorough discussion of OCR over the past four decades, see Epperson, supra note
19, at 154-73.
61. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 181 (1966). For a thorough history of the development of the
HEW guidelines, see ORFIELD, supra note 59, at 57-101.
62. See SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 63; Epperson, supra note 19, at 154-55.
63. SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 64.
64. See Dunn, supra note 50, at 44.
65. See id. (citing U.S. OFFICE OF EDUC., DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
REVISED STATEMENT OF POLICIES FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS UNDER
TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (Mar. 1966)).
66. See WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 102-08. HEW's guidelines were also
incorporated into federal court orders, giving them additional credence and weight. Id. at
107, 111-14 (citing and discussing various decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in which the court deferred or referred to the guidelines, including United
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam)); Dunn,
supra note 50, at 53-87.
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In just a few short years, primarily under the leadership of the
Johnson administration, the combined enforcement efforts of HEW
and the Civil Rights Division of DOJ transformed public education in
the South. Between 1965 and 1970, HEW, initially independently, and
later through its Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"), which was created
in 1967,
brought some 600 administrative proceedings against
noncomplying school districts. In the first year, the
Department's enforcement efforts resulted in movement
toward desegregation in every rural school district. In 1966, the
agency focused on faculty desegregation and made its first
moves beyond token desegregation of students. In 1968, rural
southern schools were put on notice that they must complete
the desegregation process by the fall of 1969. By the end of
1968, more than 200 fund terminations had been ordered under
Title VI, all of these against southern school districts.67
The Civil Rights Division found itself equally busy during these
years. Together with HEW, it "developed a joint strategy combining
administrative enforcement of Title VI [by HEW] ... with Justice
Department litigation against large numbers of school systems. '' 68 In
1966 alone, the government initiated fifty-six school desegregation
cases,69 and through the sixties, the number of suits against school
districts exceeded 500.70 Lawyers at DOJ also developed the concept
of the statewide desegregation suit, which allowed quicker access to
broad relief by attacking issues of racial segregation and
discrimination at the state (rather than individual district) level.71
What a difference it made to have so much of the federal
government's resources brought to bear on school desegregation,
even if only for those few years. Whereas just a fraction of Southern
Black students attended schools with White students in 1964, just six
years later, the South boasted the most integrated schools in the
67. SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 65.
68. Brian K. Landsberg, The Federal Government and the Promise of Brown, in
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: THE CHALLENGE FOR TODAY'S SCHOOLS 27, 30
(Ellen Condliffe Lagemann & Lamar P. Miller eds., 1996).
69. LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 14.
70. KLUGER, supra note 45, at 759.
71. Norman, supra note 47, at 987. With statewide suits, DOJ could obtain relief on
certain issues for all the offending school districts within a state without having to file
separate lawsuits against each individual district.
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country.72 By 1970, 33.1% of Black students in the South attended
schools where the majority of students were White. 73 Nationally, in
that same year, the typical Black student attended a school that was
thirty-two percent White,74 and although the Supreme Court had yet
to issue a ruling finding an affirmative duty to desegregate with
regard to Latino students at that point,75 the typical Latino student
attended a school that was 43.8% White. 76 Despite less active
enforcement (and even resistance to desegregation) over the next
decade and a half, the progress that had been made was resilient and
continued on an upward trajectory into the latter half of the 1980s.
President Johnson did not run for a second full term in 1968, and
President Richard M. Nixon's election and successful exploitation of
the "Southern Strategy '77 that year marked a major shift in the
federal government's role in school desegregation litigation and civil
rights enforcement. A staunch opponent of busing, President Nixon
and his political appointees essentially ended the federal
government's cooperation with private advocacy groups like LDF and
brought a swift end to many of the initiatives of the prior
administration. HEW phased out its Title VI fund-withholding work,
allowing discriminating school districts to continue receiving federal
funds.78 This "benign neglect ' 79 stance led to LDF filing a federal
lawsuit alleging that HEW failed to execute on its duty to enforce
Title VI in Adams v. Richardson," a lawsuit that LDF won but that
also long outlived Nixon's tenure in office." In the first year of the
Nixon presidency, HEW and new top political officials at DOJ
72. GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (HARVARD),
RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 12 (1999), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla
.edu/research/deseg/ResegregationAmericanSchools99.pdf.
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 14.
75. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
76. ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 72, at 14.
77. Briefly put, Nixon's electoral strategy was to exploit racial divisions by relying on
growing White support for the Republican Party in the South, fueled by White resentment
to the expansion of rights for African Americans and other racial minorities. See KLUGER,
supra note 45, at 763; James Boyd, Nixon's Southern Strategy, 'It's All in the Charts', N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1970, § 5 (Magazine), at 25.
78. KLUGER, supra note 45, at 764-65; SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 66.
79. The phrase "benign neglect" has been attributed to Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
KLUGER, supra note 45, at 765.
80. 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), affd in part and modified in part, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
81. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. For a more detailed history of the
Adams litigation in the early years, see STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE
LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 95-127 (1995).
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intervened in an ongoing matter involving some thirty Mississippi
school districts to seek a delay in the implementation of
desegregation plans that were set to take effect that school year.
82
This move "provoked revolt and resignation within the ranks of the
Justice Department"83 and prompted the Supreme Court to reverse
the grant of additional time and declare, in no uncertain terms, that
"the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school
systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary
schools."'
President Nixon took his anti-busing message to Congress as
well. He tried on several occasions to have an anti-busing provision
included as part of the Emergency School Aid Act ("ESAA"),5
which authorized federal funds to support local school desegregation
efforts.86 He failed in his initial attempts but ultimately succeeded two
years later, when Congress reconsidered and reauthorized ESAA; the
legislation included a ban on the use of federal monies for busing "to
overcome racial imbalance" or for transportation that threatens the
health or education of students.87 Although President Nixon never
realized his vision of a constitutional amendment that would have
banned busing altogether,88 he did manage to convince Congress to
pass the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974,89 which set
forth the federal government's policy favoring neighborhood schools
and rejecting racial balance as the goal of school desegregation. 90
Fueled by the controversial research and testimony of James
Coleman 9' on the relationship between desegregation and "white
82. WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 119; Norman, supra note 47, at 986.
83. WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 119; see also KLUGER, supra note 45, at 764 (noting
that the Nixon administration's policy toward school desegregation was obstructionist);
LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 14 & n.23 (noting that the Assistant Attorney
General tried to delay integration plans); James P. Turner, Used and Abused: The Civil
Rights Division, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1997, at C1 (indicating that many lawyers within
the Justice Department did not appreciate political interference).
84. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
85. Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 701-720, 86 Stat. 235,354-71 (1972) (repealed 1978).
86. Id.
87. SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 60 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (Supp. 1984)).
88. Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1, 13 (Gary Orfield &
Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996); Richard M. Nixon, Remarks on School Busing in Connection
with the Education Amendments of 1972 (Jun. 23, 1972), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, archivists), http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/?pid=3474.
89. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (2006)).
90. §§ 202-206, 88 Stat. at 514-16 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1705 (2006)).
91. James Coleman was a prominent social scientist who, in 1966, had submitted a
widely-publicized report to the U.S. Office of Education suggesting that racial
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flight," Congress continued over the next several years to add
symbolic provisions and amendments to various other education laws
that placed similar limitations on busing.'
Nixon and his close advisors might have had an even greater
impact on the course of school desegregation had it not been for
Watergate, which reportedly "sapped" the "political energy" from his
administration.93 What followed, according to one former career Civil
Rights Division attorney, was "a kind of pax Watergate in Nixon's
final decline through the entire Ford administration."'94
President Ford's relatively brief administration was not
particularly memorable when it came to school desegregation policy.
While not necessarily a leader on the issue, he was also not known to
hold a position as aggressively oppositional to desegregation as
Nixon. In dealing with the violence that broke out over
desegregation in Boston in 1974, for example, President Ford
responded "by speaking equivocally and acting reluctantly,"
condemning the violence but offering little in terms of substantive
direction. 96 Many view Ford's greatest contributions to education law
to be the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 19759' (the predecessor to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act 98) and the promulgation of regulations under Title IX
desegregation positively affected the academic performance of Black students and
questioning whether expanding resources in racially isolated schools alone would
significantly impact Black achievement. See PATrERSON, supra note 26, at 133-36. His
subsequent research, released in 1975, controversially linked desegregation efforts to the
flight of White parents and students from integrated schools, causing "considerable stir"
among civil rights advocates and opponents alike. Id. at 175; see GEORGE R. METCALF,
FROM LIIrrLE ROCK TO BOSTON: THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 245-46
(1983).
92. SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 61-62 (citing various statutes with anti-busing
provisions).
93. Turner, supra note 83.
94. Id.
95. MARY FRANCES BERRY, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 140-41 (2009).
96. See id. at 143-45; Lawrence J. McAndrews, Missing the Bus: Gerald Ford and
School Desegregation 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 791, 791 (1997); Gerald Ford, Remarks
on Boston School Desegregation Violence (Oct. 12, 1974), in THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECr (John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, archivists),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4457.
97. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419
(2006)).
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).
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of the Education Amendments of 1972 relating to sex discrimination
in education programs. 99 School desegregation was not on the list.
The Carter administration, which came to power in 1977, showed
much promise on school desegregation issues in its early days.
Carter's appointments to key civil rights positions included
experienced civil rights advocates and litigators,100 suggesting that the
issue would take priority under his watch. But things quickly turned
sour. LDF revived the Adams litigation, accusing Carter's OCR of
failing to fulfill its duties and comply with past orders, and that case
was consolidated with others involving similar allegations against
OCR.' The parties reached a settlement delineating the time frame
required for OCR to resolve complaints in December 1977, but, by
then, Congress had passed the so-called Eagleton-Biden Amendment
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.102 Like other anti-busing laws that
preceded it, the Eagleton-Biden Amendment placed limitations on
where students could be assigned. 10 3 Equally important, it also
curtailed the kind of relief that OCR could order through
administrative action."° As a result, OCR and DOJ under the Carter
administration regularly had to delay enforcement in school
desegregation matters to negotiate their relationship to one another,
limiting their effectiveness and efficiency.'0 5 Despite these setbacks,
however, lawyers from the Civil Rights Division were able to secure a
rare, post-Milliken decision ordering an interdistrict remedy in
99. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2008); see Michelle R. Davis, Ford's Legacy to Include Special
Education Law He Signed Despite Worries, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 3, 2007,
http://www.edweek.orglewlarticles/2007/OO3/18fordweb.h26.html.
100. Here are a few of them: Carter appointed Drew S. Days III, a prominent Black
civil rights attorney formerly affiliated with LDF, as the Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights, and Joseph Califano, Johnson's domestic and social affairs advisor, to head
HEW. Califano had an all-star cast in OCR: David S. Tatel, a prominent civil rights
attorney and former director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, was
its director; Cynthia G. Brown, a former OCR attorney under Johnson and a veteran civil
rights advocate with the Lawyers' Committee and the Children's Defense Fund, served as
the deputy director for compliance and enforcement; and Norman J. Chachkin, who had
previously worked at both LDF and the Lawyers' Committee, was the associate director
for policy, planning, and research. HALPERN, supra note 81, at 139-40.
101. Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118, 118-21 (D.D.C. 1977). The companion cases
in which further relief was sought were Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215 (D.D.C.
1976) and Women's Equity Action League v. Weinberger (WEAL), No. 74-1720 (D.D.C.
Nov. 26, 1974). HALPERN, supra note 81, at 140-49.
102. Act of Jan. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-206, § 209, 90 Stat. 3, 22.
103. Id.; see SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 62.
104. See METCALF, supra note 91, at 236-40.
105. HALPERN, supra note 81, at 153-62.
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Indianapolis,"°6 and initiated what was to become the first case finding
a link between school and housing policy in Yonkers, New York. 7
The Carter administration also made attempts to coordinate its
housing and school desegregation work, but the efforts were cut short
by the election of President Ronald Reagan. 0 8
Even more than President Nixon, President Reagan has been
accused of conducting a wholesale assault on civil rights, and school
desegregation was no exception. 109 Political operatives from the White
House formulated a civil rights policy that consisted of a resistance to
traditional school desegregation remedies in favor of voluntary
transfer programs, magnet schools, and neighborhood schools;
opposition to race-conscious remedies; minimal civil rights
enforcement and federal involvement in educational policymaking;
and deference to state and local control." To execute much of this
vision, Reagan appointed William Bradford Reynolds, a seasoned
commercial litigator with "little experience in civil rights," as
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.'11 Overnight, the federal
government's position in ongoing litigation changed course. In scores
of school desegregation cases across the country, DOJ began taking
the side of school districts rather than private plaintiffs, Black
communities, and civil rights groups, sometimes proposing plans that
were so costly and that would undo so much progress that even the
school boards opposed them."' The work of Reynolds and the Civil
106. United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Ind. 1979), affd in
relevant part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980).
107. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
108. Orfield, supra note 88, at 16.
109. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, III, The Court's Response to the Reagan Civil Rights
Agenda, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1008-11 (1989); Drew S. Days, III, Turning Back the
Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 319-
30 (1984) [hereinafter Days, Turning Back the Clock]; Joel L. Selig, The Reagan Justice
Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 795-817.
Stephen Halpern quotes leaders in the civil rights community who, at the time, expressed
deep concern about Reagan's civil rights stances. HALPERN, supra note 81, at 192-93.
Even Clarence Thomas, who had just replaced J. Clay Smith as the head of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, criticized DOJ at the time for setting" 'a negative
rather than a positive agenda on civil rights.' "Id. at 193.
110. See generally Days, Turning Back the Clock, supra note 109, at 319-30 (discussing
the Reagan administration's opposition to traditional methods of desegregation,
particularly busing).
111. BERRY, supra note 95, at 191 (describing Reynolds as "a corporate lawyer with no
previous civil rights experience"); see also HALPERN, supra note 81, at 191 ("An
accomplished lawyer in commercial litigation and regulatory matters, Reynolds had little
experience in civil rights law, a deficiency that he saw as an asset.").
112. See SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 72 (describing the circumstances relating to
desegregation litigation in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana); Days, Turning Back the Clock,
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Rights Division was so controversial that it led to a revolt among
career attorneys even greater than that which took place during the
Nixon administration.113
Reagan's opposition to busing and preference for school choice
was felt beyond DOJ as well. Within months after he assumed office,
President Reagan signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981,11' which terminated funding for hundreds of federal programs,
the largest of which was the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972.115
Congress, with Reagan's approval, later restored federal funding only
for that portion of ESAA authorizing grants for magnet schools,
creating the federal Magnet Schools Assistance Program. 16 Officials
in DOJ under the Reagan administration also supported an
amendment debated in Congress that would have eliminated the
authority of federal courts to order busing remedies in school
desegregation cases that involved the transportation of students
distances beyond five miles or fifteen minutes. 1 7 Not only did
Reagan's Attorney General, William French Smith, endorse the
proposal, he drafted a letter to Congress stating his opinion that the
bill was constitutional, even though senior DOJ officials from the
Eisenhower, Nixon, Johnson, and Carter administrations all raised
questions about its constitutionality.'
18
Reagan also left his mark on the Civil Rights Commission. For
two and a half decades, it had developed a reputation as a well-
functioning, independent entity, providing important research and
valuable policy guidance to Republican and Democratic
supra note 109, at 328-29 (same). Joel Selig, a former supervisor in the education and
housing sections of the Civil Rights Division, see Selig, supra note 109, at 785, tells of the
Department's politicized handling of the Kansas City desegregation case and its "refus[al]
to implement binding case law" under Reynolds. Selig, supra note 109, at 810, 796-814; see
also Orfield, supra note 88, at 17-18 (describing the general shift in school desegregation
philosophy of DOJ under Reagan).
113. See HALPERN, supra note 81, at 193; see also Selig, supra note 109, at 785-86
(discussing the author's negative experience within the Division after President Reagan's
election).
114. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
115. §§ 502-596, 95 Stat. at 441-482.
116. Education for Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, §§ 701-712, 98 Stat.
1267, 1299-1302 (1984), repealed by August F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary
and Secondary Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 2303, 102 Stat.
130, 324.
117. See SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 73-74; Days, Turning Back the Clock, supra
note 109, at 323; Linda Greenhouse, Busing Bill Backed by Administration, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1982, at Al.
118. SALOMONE, supra note 59, at 73-74; Days, Turning Back the Clock, supra note
109, at 323.
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administrations alike. 119 But in his first year in office, Reagan fired the
Commission's chair, Republican Arthur S. Flemming, for criticizing
the administration's civil rights policies, and replaced him with
Clarence Pendleton, a conservative, politically-connected Black
Republican.120 This move did little to silence the Commission,
however, which continued over the next few years to issue reports
critical of the Reagan administration, prompting the President to seek
the removal and replacement of those commissioners with whom he
did not agree. 2' Congress sought to resolve the conflict by
reorganizing the Commission, expanding its membership from six to
eight, dividing up who had the authority to appoint the members, and
placing some limitations on the number of seats held by any one
party, 122 but this compromise did not save the Commission's
reputation, which had lost too much of its luster and legitimacy in all
the political skirmish. 123 In the words of Mary Frances Berry, one of
the members who publicly resisted Reagan's attempts to remove her,
the President had managed to transform the Commission into " 'a
lapdog for the administration instead of a watchdog' " on civil
rights. 124
As the Reagan era bled into George H. W. Bush's ("Bush I")
presidency, the philosophy remained largely the same, even if the
execution was more subtle and the term half as long. Like Reagan,
119. See BERRY, supra note 95, at 4 (citing influence of the Civil Rights Commission
over the years on major federal civil rights legislation); see also id. at 9-181 (tracing
Commission's history up through the Reagan years); LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND, RESTORING THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION: A REPORT ON
THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 12-23 (2009) [hereinafter RESTORING THE
CONSCIENCE OF A NATION], http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/commission/
lccrefcommission-report-march2009.pdf (same); Frye et al., supra note 46, at 456-76
(same).
120. Kathy Sawyer, President to Push Flemming Off Civil Rights Commission, WASH.
POST, Nov. 17, 1981, at Al. Reagan also nominated the former chair of the Republican
National Committee to replace Stephen Horn as the Commission's vice-chair. Id.
121. See Charles Fishman, Rights Panel Hits Reagan on Schools, WASH. POST, July 13,
1983, at Al; Peter Grier, Senate Grabs Civil Rights Spotlight, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 14, 1983, at 6.
122. See United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-183, 97
Stat. 1301 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (2006)).
123. See generally Frye et al., supra note 46, at 478-505 (describing how the
Commission's "institutional deficiencies and ideological shifts ... have ... damaged the
Commission's independence").
124. Juan Williams, Rights Panel Backs Reagan in Opposing Quotas, WASH. POST, Jan.
18, 1984, at Al. Mary Frances Berry's recent comprehensive history of the Commission,
And Justice for All, tells of this power struggle-and the resulting damage to the
Commission's reputation-in great detail from her perspective. BERRY, supra note 95, at
182-215.
[Vol. 88
RACIALLY INTEGRA TED EDUCATION
Bush I opposed race-conscious policies, and his administration
viewed school desegregation largely as "a wrenching and unsuccessful
experiment of racial mixing."125 According to a 1991 report issued by
the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights,26 the Bush I administration
eased the pressure that the Reagan administration's DOJ had applied
on school districts to abandon desegregation plans, but its promise to
battle racial discrimination was largely empty rhetoric. 127 When it
came to school desegregation, the Civil Rights Division under Bush I
acted more as a passive caretaker than an advocate, and its
participation in desegregation cases before the Supreme Court, not
quite as adversarial toward traditional desegregation as Reagan's, was
criticized nonetheless for its tepid support of civil rights.
Like Bush I, President William J. Clinton, ultimately, is not
credited with fundamentally altering the course of school
desegregation and integration. With regard to education issues more
generally, President Clinton's reforms sought to address the needs of
disadvantaged students and continued to reflect his predecessors'
concern for improving standards and student achievement. In 1994,
Clinton signed into law the Goals 2000: Educate America Act,
128
legislation developed in part under the watch of President George H.
W. Bush.129 In many ways responsive to the Nation at Risk report, 3 '
issued under the Reagan administration in 1983, and a precursor to
125. Larry Tye, US Sounds Retreat in School Integration, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1992,
at 1.
126. The Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights formed during the Reagan years when
it seemed to many progressive advocates that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was no
longer up to the task. See Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights, About, History,
http://www.cccr.org/template/page.cfm?id=5 (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
127. See Elise J. Rabekoff, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement in Elementary and
Secondary Education: The Bush Administration's Record So Far, in LOST
OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION MID-
TERM 37, 37-51 (Susan M. Liss & William L. Taylor eds., 1991) [hereinafter LOST
OPPORTUNITIES]; Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 126 (explaining
motive for forming the Citizen's Commission).
128. Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (repealed 2002) (allocating funds to states and
communities to develop standards for students, creating a national board and national
council to monitor and assist in the development of these standards, and providing
resources for localities to meet these goals).
129. Mary Jordan, Vote Nears on National School Goals; $100 Million at Risk if
Standards Aren't Approved by April 1, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1994, at Al (noting that the
Goals 2000: Educate America Act included standards developed out of an education
summit that President Bush I had convened in 1989); Jill Zuckman, Modest School Reform
Bill May Fare Better than Bush's, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1994, at 3 (same).
130. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), http://datacenter.spps.org/sites/
2259653e-ffb3-45ba-8fd6-04a024ecf7a4/uploads/SOTW ANation at Risk_1983.pdf.
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the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,11 Goals 2000 was based on a
snowballing standards movement that continues even today. 132 The
Clinton administration sought to advance comprehensive reform
through the passage that same year of the Improving America's
Schools Act ("IASA"), 33 which reauthorized the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 19653 and further expanded the
government's role in public education across many areas, with a large
portion of the appropriated federal funds going toward assisting
disadvantaged children. 13 5
To be sure, Clinton spoke passionately and often about the
importance of civil rights and racial diversity, but his actions, for the
most part, were moderate in substance and modest in scope. By a
mile, he appointed more people of color and women to the federal
bench and to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet positions than any of his
predecessors. 36 To promote more open dialogue on issues of race
relations, Clinton created a special advisory committee, called the
President's Advisory Board on Race, headed by John Hope
Franklin.'37 He also helped revive, to some extent, the Civil Rights
Commission, which had languished under the partisan politics of the
Reagan and Bush I administrations,'38 but that shift occurred toward
the latter half of his tenure. 13 9 Clinton has been credited, too, for
131. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
132. See Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved Challenge:
Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1036-37 (2008).
133. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.).
134. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578
(2006)).
135. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518. IASA also reauthorized funds for the Magnet
Schools Assistance Program and slightly modified its objectives. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7202-7203
(1994). Magnet school funding was again modified and reauthorized as part of the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001,20 U.S.C. § 7231 (2006).
136. Plass, supra note 43, at 180-81.
137. Exec. Order No. 13,050, 3 C.F.R. 207 (1998), (revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,128,
3 C.F.R. 218 (2000)); Dr. John Hope Franklin, Chair, http://clinton4.nara.gov/Initiatives/
OneAmerica/BIO-JHF.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
138. See generally Michael J. Kelleher & Michael L. Walker, The Performance of the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, in THE TEST OF OUR PROGRESS: THE CLINTON
RECORD ON CIVIL RIGHTS 73, 73-96 (Corrine M. Yu & William L. Taylor eds., 1999),
available at http:l/www.cccr.orgldoc/progress.pdf (discussing the accomplishments of the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights during the Clinton administration). The Commission in
these years was embroiled in some controversy, however, when the U.S. General
Accounting Office criticized its financial and organizational management. See id. at 79-81.
139. BERRY, supra note 95, at 275 ("[T]he agency remained fractured and evenly
divided along ideological lines until well into Clinton's second term."); id. at 302 (citing
the "fragile independence" the Commission worked to reestablish during the Clinton
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speaking out in strong support of affirmative action,14 ° but this did not
stem the assault on race-conscious programs by conservative legal
groups during his administration. 4' Indeed, emboldened by the
turning tide in school desegregation law, many of these groups and
individuals began more aggressively challenging voluntarily adopted
school integration plans as well. In response, DOJ's Civil Rights
Division under Clinton-headed by LDF alums, first Deval Patrick,
and later Bill Lann Lee' 42-filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the
voluntary integration plans that had been challenged in Montgomery
County, Maryland,'43 Arlington County, Virginia,' and (at least for
the period it was being litigated during Clinton's tenure) Lynn,
Massachusetts.145 Clinton's words and deeds on race issues won him
approval from the African American community, and some regarded
him as the country's first Black President.'46 Yet, despite these not
insignificant contributions, it cannot be said that Clinton articulated
much of a coherent vision to reverse the pattern of school
resegregation that the nation was already witnessing during his time
in office. I47
administration). For Berry's account of the Commission under the Clinton years, see id. at
272-301.
140. See, e.g., James Bennet, President's Press Conference: The Overview, Clinton
Urges Education Aid for Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1997, at A25 (describing one of
Clinton's forthright speeches in support of affirmative action).
141. See generally LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON DIVERSITY: AN ORGANIZED
CHALLENGE TO RACIAL AND GENDER JUSTICE (2003) (describing the efforts of
conservative groups and individuals to overturn affirmative action programs and other
race-conscious civil rights measures).
142. Steven A. Holmes, Asian-American Is Named to Top Civil Rights Position, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 1997, at B16 (noting that Bill Lee is a former LDF attorney); Steven A.
Holmes, Street Survivor via Harvard: Deval Laurdine Patrick, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1994, at
A13 (noting that Deval L. Patrick is a former LDF attorney).
143. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees Urging
Affirmance, Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123
(4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2503).
144. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Tuttle ex rel. Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-1604).
145. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Interest of the United States,
Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000) (Civ. A.
No. 99-cv-11811), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/edo/documents/lynnbr.php.
146. Famed author Toni Morrison is usually credited as one of the first people to dub
Clinton as the "first black President." Toni Morrison, The Talk of the Town, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 5, 1998, at 31. Of Clinton, she said that he was "[b]lacker than any actual
black person who could ever be elected in our children's lifetime. After all, Clinton
displays almost every trope of blackness: single-parent household, born poor, working-
class, saxophone-playing, McDonald's-and-junk-food-loving boy from Arkansas." Id. at
31-32.
147. See Dennis Parker, The Clinton Administration's Record on Equal Educational
Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Education, in THE TEST OF OUR PROGRESS,
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II. 2001 TO 2008
President George W. Bush's ("Bush II") education agenda
included tackling the racial achievement gap, and, early in his first
term, he received bipartisan support for the No Child Left Behind
Act ("NCLB"),"' which sought to increase accountability, promote
school choice, and place a stronger emphasis on standards. 149 Despite
his expressed concern for minority children, however, critics assailed
Bush II, like Nixon and Reagan before him, throughout his tenure in
office for taking far-right positions on issues of race generally and for
being indifferent at best-and by most measures, aggressively
opposed-to efforts to promote racial integration and diversity
specifically. To add to that chorus of criticism, in the waning days of
his administration, several scathing internal governmental
investigations and related congressional hearings accused the Bush II
administration of unprecedented partisan meddling in the legal affairs
of DO. 15° The reports charged that within the Civil Rights Division,
for instance, senior political appointees and high-level officials
supra note 138, at 187, 187-89 (observing, toward the end of Clinton's tenure, that there
remained long-term questions about school desegregation that the Civil Rights Division
would have to answer).
148. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.).
149. Id.; see U.S. Dep't of Educ., Executive Summary of the No Child Left Behind Act,
http://www2.ed.gov/nclbloverview/intro/execsumm.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
150. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN & OFFICE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF
POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL
RIGHTS DIVISION (2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf
(finding that political and ideological screening was used with regard to career attorneys in
DOJ); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY
MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
(2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf (finding that several
high level political staff had considered the perceived political and ideological leanings in
hiring of career Assistant United States Attorneys and other DOJ employees, including
judges for the Board of Immigration Appeals); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. &
OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HONORS
PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0806/final.pdf (finding that, at least after 2006, political
and ideological screens were used to deselect many candidates for summer internships at
DOJ Honors Program); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF
NINE U.S. ATrORNEYS IN 2006 (2008), available at www.justice.gov/oig/specialU
s0809a/final.pdf (finding that the firing of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006 was "fundamentally
flawed"). The removal of the nine U.S. Attorneys "severely damaged the credibility of the
[DOJ] and raised doubts as to the integrity of the Department prosecutive decisions." AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006, supra at 358.
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regularly improperly considered political and ideological affiliations
to hire and fire career attorneys.' Civil rights advocates claimed that
these actions were made that much worse by Bush II's selections to
head major offices affecting civil rights, many of whom lacked
relevant experience or were known to have taken policy positions in
the past that undermined the very laws they were asked to enforce.'52
Critics were quick to point out the dramatic effect that this
alleged politicization had on the work conducted across the ten
substantive practice areas of the Civil Rights Division. Overall, the
emphasis of enforcement shifted away from attacking racial
discrimination-what had been the bread and butter of the Division
since its creation in 1957-to pursuing religious discrimination.'53
Within individual sections, evidence of the de-emphasis on race could
be found in the cases filed and positions taken. In its voting rights
practice, for example, the Civil Rights Division initiated one case in
eight years on behalf of African Americans alleging voting
discrimination under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,'
compared to eighteen such cases under the Clinton administration.'55
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Epperson, supra note 19, at 166-67 ("President George W. Bush's
administrative stance ... may be due in part to his administration's appointment of several
long-time opponents of affirmative action to key administrative positions."). For instance,
John Ashcroft, Bush II's first selection for Attorney General, was criticized by civil rights
advocates for having "resisted court-ordered integration of the public schools" when he
was Governor of Missouri. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TAKES AIM, supra note 17, at 9;
see also Wayne Washington, US Civil Rights Chief Responds to Critics, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 23, 2002, at Al (describing Ashcroft as "the most conservative attorney general since
the Reagan administration"). Gerald Reynolds, Bush II's first choice for the position of
the U.S. Department of Education's Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, and the recipient
of a recess appointment, was criticized by the civil rights community as a conservative
activist who attacked race-conscious remedies as "corrupt" and disparaged traditional civil
rights organizations. Michael A. Fletcher, Civil Rights Watchdog Once Outspoken Critic:
Education Official Softens Controversial Views, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2002, at A17.
153. Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 HARV. L. & POL. REV.
211, 225 (2008) ("The few briefs that the [Appellate] Division has filed reflect the general
emphasis seen in other Sections [of the Civil Rights Division]: a priority on religious
discrimination and away from cases of racial discrimination against African Americans.");
Charlie Savage, White House to Shift Efforts on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at
Al ("Under the Bush administration, the agency shifted away from its traditional core
focus on accusations of racial discrimination, channeling the resources into areas like
religious discrimination and human trafficking.").
154. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
155. See Kennedy, supra note 153, at 222 (citing United States v. City of Euclid, 523 F.
Supp. 2d 641 (N.D. Ohio 2007)); see also Joseph D. Rich, Mark Posner & Robert Kengle,
The Voting Section, in THE EROSION OF RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 32, 41 ("Whereas eight
of the 22 Section 2 cases filed in the last six years of the Clinton administration were on
behalf of African American citizens, and six were on behalf of American Indians, only two
Section 2 cases of any type have been filed by [the Bush II] administration on behalf of
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The Voting Rights Section under Bush II also filed the first ever case
alleging voting discrimination against White voters. 56 Morale in that
Section allegedly plummeted.'57 Similar priorities were reflected in
the Employment Section, which filed almost as many cases in Bush
II's eight years alleging job discrimination against Whites as it did
cases alleging discrimination against Blacks and/or Latinos
combined.
15 8
The Educational Opportunities Section, on the other hand,
which is responsible for the hundreds of school desegregation cases
that remain on DOJ's docket, reportedly "received relatively little
public attention during the Bush Administration, and ... has
apparently been spared from some of the worst political pressures." '159
Nonetheless, critics charged that the administration's aversion to
race-conscious remedies was felt powerfully there as well. For
instance, DOJ reversed its course on affirmative action in higher
education. Whereas the Clinton administration filed an amicus brief
in support of the assignment policies at issue in the University of
Michigan cases,16° the Bush II administration opposed them, arguing
that the plans violated the Constitution and asked the Court to find
that racial diversity must be pursued only through race-neutral
means. 61 A similar about-face occurred at the K-12 level. Despite
having supported voluntary school integration in Tuttle ex rel. Tuttle
v. Arlington County School Board,6 2 Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Public Schools,'163 and Comfort ex rel. Neumyer
African American citizens and none has been filed on behalf of American Indian
citizens.").
156. United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (Feb. 17, 2005),
affd, 561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009); see Kennedy, supra note 153, at 222; Dan Eggen,
Politics Alleged in Voting Cases: Justice Officials Are Accused of Influence, WASH. POST,
Jan. 23, 2006, at Al (describing the case filed alleging discrimination against White voters
as "the department's first reverse-discrimination complaint on behalf of white voters");
Dan Eggen, Civil Rights Focus Shift Roils Staff at Justice, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2005, at
Al (same).
157. See Kennedy, supra note 153, at 222. By 2007, more than half of the career voting
rights attorneys had departed, sometimes involuntarily. Id.
158. Id. at 224.
159. Id. at 226.
160. See Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1589, 1595 (2003) (noting that the Clinton administration had filed briefs in the
lower courts supporting respondent).
161. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TAKES AIM, supra note 17, at 27-28; see Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12-31, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 9-37, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
162. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
163. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).
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v. Lynn School Committee"6 under Clinton,165 DOJ under Bush II
discontinued its support of the plan in Comfort"6 and then switched
its position altogether by the time Parents Involved reached the
Supreme Court.167 Rather than working to advance racially integrated
education, DOJ took the position that race must not be considered to
achieve that goal. 68 Meanwhile, hundreds of court orders in the
traditional school desegregation cases under the Section's
responsibility were dissolved, very few of them formally opposed by
DOJ.
169
Critics also assailed the Department of Education's Office for
Civil Rights under the Bush II administration for serving the interests
of far right-wing groups that opposed any consideration of race, even
as that office struggled for stability in leadership. 7 ° The civil rights
community charged, for example, that OCR's complaint investigation
procedures provided a venue for opponents of affirmative action to
use government resources to intimidate colleges and universities by
investigating unmeritorious challenges to recruitment, outreach, and
admissions practices designed to increase enrollments of traditionally
164. 100 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000).
165. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
166. Cf Press Release, Citizens' Comm'n on Civil Rights, The Bush Administration v.
Affirmative Action (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www.cccr.org/AffirmativeActionReport.pdf
(discussing the Clinton administration's involvement and arguing that the Bush II
administration "put diversity on the shelf").
167. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6-30,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-
908).
168. See id. at 19-24.
169. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
170. See Peter Schmidt, The Bush White House Picks Its Civil-Rights Fights Carefully:
The President's Appointees Mix Caution with Conservatism in Handling Colleges' Disputes
over Race and Gender, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 19, 2006, at A20. Bush II's first
appointee to head OCR, a conservative African American Republican utility-services
lawyer, Gerald A. Reynolds, was vigorously opposed by civil rights groups and members
of Congress alike for his statements against affirmative action and other race-conscious
remedies, which led to his controversial recess appointment and eventual departure after
nineteen months in office. See id. For more about Reynolds, see supra note 152 and infra
note 196 and accompanying text. Over the next five years, OCR operated without a
permanent chief, as Kenneth L. Marcus and then James F. Manning served as interim
directors; during this time, observers from both the right and left complained that the
office lacked leadership and failed to take on any major initiatives. See Schmidt, supra. It
was not until June 2005 that Bush II nominated a permanent director, Stephanie J.
Monroe, a Republican career Capitol Hill staffer whom the Senate was willing to confirm.
See id. Critics charged that OCR's race-blind interpretation of civil rights laws evidenced
itself throughout the tenure of all four directors. See id.
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underrepresented groups."' These investigations and threats of
litigation had a chilling effect among higher education institutions,
some of which eliminated programs and policies to avoid drawn-out
legal battles. 7 2 Meanwhile, OCR's affirmative enforcement priorities
witnessed a shift away from racial discrimination and school
desegregation issues, abandoning its traditional focus in these areas.'73
The total number of affirmative compliance reviews initiated each
year also decreased, from as high as 152 under the Clinton years (in
1997), to as few as eleven (in 2002) and nine (in 2006). 74
OCR's guidance on the use of race was similarly revised in the
Bush II administration. A year after the Supreme Court approved, in
Grutter v. Bollinger'75  and Gratz v. Bollinger,176  the limited
consideration of race to promote diversity in higher education, 77
OCR issued a report stressing the use of race-neutral admission
strategies.1 78 Four years later, OCR issued a "Dear Colleague" letter
171. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., CLOSING THE GAP: MOVING FROM
RHETORIC TO REALITY IN OPENING DOORS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR AFRICAN-
AMERICAN STUDENTS 9-10 (2005), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/
gap/ClosingtheGap-_.Moving__fromRhetoric-to_-Reality.pdf. Somewhat amusingly,
the LDF report caused enough of a stir from Bush II's first appointee to OCR (who, by
then, had moved on to head the Civil Rights Commission, see infra note 196 and
accompanying text) that he sent a letter on behalf of the Civil Rights Commission stating
that a majority of its members "strongly disagree with the Legal Defense Fund's report
and would like to set the record straight." Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Chairman,
U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, to the Honorable Margaret Spellings, Sec'y of Educ., U.S.
Dep't of Educ. (July 5, 2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/correspd/
090905spellings.pdf. One commissioner sent a letter dissenting from the majority view and
suggesting that the Department of Education ("DOE") and OCR might have asked the
commission to" 'bless' the activities of DOE and OCR and therefore, by association, give
its current programs and policies a legitimacy they do not deserve without a full and fair
debate on the issue." Letter from Michael Yaki, Comm'r, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, to
the Honorable Margaret Spelling, Sec'y of Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ. (July 6, 2005),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/correspd/090905yaki.pdf.
172. See Epperson, supra note 19, at 169-70 (citing reports from affirmative action
opponents that "more than 100 colleges... abandoned their race-conscious policies" as a
result of OCR investigations and threats of litigation).
173. Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No
Child Left Behind Act's Race Conscious Accountability, 47 HOw. L.J. 243,287-88 (2004).
174. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS OF THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, FISCAL YEAR 2007-08, at 3 (2007)
[hereinafter OCR ANNUAL REPORT 2007-08], available at www.ed.gov/about/reports/
annual/ocr/annrpt2007-08/annrpt2007-08.pdf.
175. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
176. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
177. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-76.
178. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ACHIEVING DIVERSITY:
RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (2004), available at
http://www.ed.govlaboutloffices/listlocr/edlite-raceneutralreport2.html. Compare, for
instance, this response from OCR (and the Bush II administration generally) to Grutter-
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again encouraging the use of only race-neutral measures, describing
any consideration of race in admissions as "highly suspect," and
setting forth detailed parameters for any college or university that
may use race in admissions.179 This unusually timed guidance
prompted LDF to question whether OCR issued the letter "to further
its efforts to subvert and give unnecessary pause to higher education
institutions that are pursuing a racially diverse student population in a
constitutional manner."'180
Nor did Bush II's OCR waver in its advice on the consideration
of race to advance racial and ethnic integration in elementary and
secondary schools. On August 28, 2008, the same day that it released
its "Dear Colleague" letter regarding affirmative action in higher
education, OCR issued similar guidance to school districts regarding
race-conscious student assignment plans in light of Parents
Involved.' That letter referenced two prior compelling interests
approved by the Supreme Court-remedying past discrimination and
achieving diversity in higher education' 82-but neglected to mention
that a majority of the Justices recognized that school districts also
have a compelling interest to promote integration and avoid racial
an affirmative action victory-to the response of President Clinton after the Supreme
Court's 1995 Adarand decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995),
which was ostensibly an affirmative action defeat. See William J. Clinton, President of the
United States, Statement on the Supreme Court Decision on Affirmative Action (June 13,
1995), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters,
archivists), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51488 (expressing support for
affirmative action and expressing regret that the Court's opinion had caused many to
abandon the fight for its continued use); William J. Clinton, President of the United
States, Satellite Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with the National Council
of La Raza (July 19, 1995), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (John T. Woolley
& Gerhard Peters, archivists), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51633 (stating that
the Clinton administration will continue to pursue affirmative action and that the lesson of
the Supreme Court decision is "to mend but not end affirmative action").
179. Letter from Stephanie J. Monroe, Assistant Sec'y of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., The Use of Race in Postsecondary Student Admissions (Aug. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/raceadmissionpse.html; see also OCR
ANNUAL REPORT 2007-08, supra note 174, at 25 (referencing issuance and summarizing
contents of letter).
180. Statement of the NAACP Legal Def. Fund on Diversity in Higher Educ., A
Response to OCR's August 28, 2008 "Dear Colleague" Letter (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=1323.
181. Letter from Stephanie J. Monroe, Assistant Sec'y of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., The Use of Race in Assigning Students to Elementary and Secondary Schools
(Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/raceassignmentese.html;
see also OCR ANNUAL REPORT 2007-08, supra note 174, at 25 (referencing issuance and
summarizing contents of letter).
182. Monroe, supra note 181.
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isolation.'83 Moreover, the letter neglected to mention the kinds of
permissible race-conscious measures that Justice Kennedy explicitly
contemplated in his concurrence. 184
A third "Dear Colleague" letter from OCR, issued just days
before Bush II was to leave office, emphasized that the
administration's school choice policies were not to be constrained by
any racial considerations (targeting, presumably, only those race-
conscious policies that seek to avoid any racial isolation that may be
created or exacerbated by the choice to transfer). 85 In other words,
the letter established that federal school choice policies trumped any
local efforts to consider race to promote integration. The letter
further advised that districts must seek court modification if any
federal desegregation orders conflict with the transfer provisions of
NCLB.'186 At the same time, school district recipients of magnet
school funding reported that OCR officials initiated reviews
demanding that they justify any consideration of race in their student
assignment policies, 87 even though the primary statutory purpose of
the federal magnet school program is to promote racial and ethnic
integration.
88
Finally, the civil rights community continued to question the
activities of the Civil Rights Commission under Bush II. Because the
Commission had, since the Reagan administration, essentially been
dismissed as little more than a cheerleader for the civil rights
initiatives (or lack thereof) of the White House, few expected much
183. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 804 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J.,
and Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Statement of the NAACP Legal Def. Fund on Promoting
Diversity in Schools, A Response to OCR's August 28, 2008 "Dear Colleague" Letter
(Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=1317.
184. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Statement of
the NAACP Legal Def. Fund on Promoting Diversity in Schools, supra note 183.
185. Letter from Stephanie J. Monroe, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., Title VI and Public School Choice (Jan. 8, 2009), available at
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20090108.pdf.
186. See id.
187. Mark Walsh, Use of Race as a Concern for Magnet Schools; Decision in Student-
Assignment Cases Came as U.S. Reviewed Grant Applications, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 31,
2007, at 8.
188. See 20 U.S.C. § 7231(b) (2006) (setting forth purposes of magnet schools); see also
OCR ANNUAL REPORT 2007-08, supra note 174, at 46 (stating that the OCR has the
authority and obligation to "determine whether applicant school districts will meet
nondiscrimination assurances" specified in the Magnet School Assistance Program
("MSAP") and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The OCR Annual Report
references, obliquely, the "negotiation of agreements to address specific civil rights
concerns" and the provision of "technical assistance to the majority of MSAP recipients to
help them comply with the civil rights aspects of the MSAP statute." Id.
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else from it under George W. Bush's watch. There had been a brief
political scuffle early in Bush II's first term about the legitimacy of
one of his appointments, which would have resulted in a shift in which
political party held a majority of the seats, but that legal dispute
ended with Bush II's appointee the victor.' 89 Because Republicans
held a majority of the seats, it came as something of a surprise when,
in September 2004, the career staff of the Commission released a
scathing draft report on the administration's civil rights record.1"°
Entitled Redefining Rights in America: The Civil Rights Record of the
George W. Bush Administration, 2001-2004, the draft criticized
Bush's failure to enforce civil rights across the board and concluded
that he had neither "defined a clear agenda nor made civil rights a
priority.""1 1 Indeed, as its title suggests, the draft report accused Bush
of "redefining" the very concept of civil rights by "refer[ring] to
programs that have little or no civil rights relevance as ones that
promote equality and justice."'92
The draft was never finalized. Republican political appointees on
the Commission attacked it as inaccurate and biased,193 and a vote on
formal approval of it was delayed until after the 2004 presidential
election.'94 Once the outcome was clear, the divided Commission
predictably failed to approve the report.'95 Mary Frances Berry-who
189. Clinton appointed Valerie Wilson to the Commission in January 2000 to fill the
seat of the late Judge A. Leon Higginbotham. See BERRY, supra note 95, at 325-28. In
December 2001, shortly after Judge Higginbotham's term would have expired, Bush II
appointed Peter Kirsanow to replace Wilson, but Wilson resisted on the theory that she
had been appointed to a full six-year term, and not just to complete the term of Judge
Higginbotham. See id. At first, the Bush II administration insisted that Kirsanow be
seated, but Mary Frances Berry, the then-chair, refused to recognize him. See id.; Seat
Bush Nominee, Rights Panel Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at A19. The parties
litigated the issue; although Wilson won in the district court, in May 2002, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and held that her term had expired. United States v.
Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 361-62 (D.C. Cir.).
190. Perhaps it was not entirely a surprise because, until late 2004, Mary Frances Berry
remained the Chair of the Commission, continued to resist the influence of her
Republican colleagues, and-some contended-played a key role in the drafting of the
report that was credited to the career staff. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Redefining
Rights in America, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18,2004, at A18.
191. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS EVALUATION, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
REDEFINING RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD OF THE GEORGE W.
BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 2001-2004, at vii (Draft Report for Commissioners' Review,
Sept. 2004), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/bushcivilrights.pdf.
192. Id. at 163.
193. See, e.g., Thernstrom, supra note 190.
194. BERRY, supra note 95, at 331-33; Michael Janofsky, Study of Bush and Civil
Rights Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A22.
195. See Erica Werner, Top Two Commissioners Resign from Civil Rights Panel,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8,2004, at A7.
2010]
756 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88
by then had served nearly twenty-five years on the Commission and
was its current chair-resigned, and Gerald Reynolds, Bush II's first
OCR director, replaced her.
196
President Bush coupled the appointment of Reynolds as the
Commission's chair (and Abigail Thernstrom as its vice-chair) with a
second controversial move. That same month-December 2004-he
sought and received an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel that
allowed him to appoint two additional Republican members to the
eight-member Commission without violating the statute's
requirement that " '[n]ot more than 4 of the members ... at any one
time be of the same political party.' ""9 Bush 1I was able to achieve
this result because, in the period leading up to the new appointments,
two of the existing Republican members-Thernstrom and Russell
Redenbaugh-switched their party registrations and became
independents.'98 The Office of Legal Counsel approved this action in
a memo the day before the appointments were made.1 99 The move,
according to legal experts, was unprecedented, and shortly after it was
discovered, civil rights leaders called for a reversal of the legal
opinion Bush II had obtained to make it happen.
2 0
But their efforts were unsuccessful, and the newly constituted
Commission was able to pursue a relentless attack on traditional civil
196. BERRY, supra note 95, at 333-34; Werner, supra note 195. Reynolds was referred
to as a "conservative who once described affirmative action as a 'big lie' " and who
believes that "traditional civil rights groups ... overstate the problem" of racial
discrimination. Randal C. Archibold, Shift Toward Skepticism for Civil Rights Panel, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A22. Berry's departure, however, was again not without
controversy. She believed that her term, and that of her colleague and vice-chair, Cruz
Reynoso, expired in January 2005, but President Bush II not only named their
replacements in December, BERRY, supra note 95, at 333-34, he obtained a legal opinion
from the Office of Legal Counsel to support the position that their terms were to expire
more than a month earlier. See Terms of Members of the Civil Rights Commission, 28 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel (Nov. 30, 2004), available at www.justice.gov/olc/2004/11302004
_crcterms.pdt
197. Political Balance Requirement for the Civil Rights Commission, 28 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel (Dec. 6, 2004), available at www.justice.gov/olc/2004/12062004crcbalance.pdf
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1975(b)).
198. See Charlie Savage, Maneuver Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2007, at Al. Interestingly, the story of these back channel methods that
Bush II used did not break until November 2007.
199. Political Balance Requirement for the Civil Rights Commission, supra note 197.
200. See Letter from Wade Henderson, President & CEO, Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights et al., to the Honorable Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Rescind the OLC Opinion that Undermines the Credibility of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights (Jan. 29, 2008), available at www.citizensforethics.org/node/
30912.
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rights.2 °1 With regard to issues of educational diversity and school
integration, for instance, the Commission held convenings and issued
reports, not in support of affirmative action in higher education, but
instead "warn[ing] that affirmative action might harm minority law
students."2' The Commission asked the American Bar Association to
end its support for racial and ethnic diversity in law school
admissions.2013 Critics argued that another lengthy report focused on
school desegregation did not press for better enforcement of orders
or for reviving the federal government's commitment to
desegregation but instead questioned the value of racial diversity and
concluded "that school districts obtaining unitary status do not
exhibit less integration. ' '201 With regularity, the Commission's findings
and recommendations were approved by a vote of five or six to one
or two, with a few abstentions. 20 5 The only saving grace for civil rights
advocates was that, by this point, the Commission's credibility had
waned.206
III. 2009 AND BEYOND
Just over a year into his first term in office, President Barack
Obama's actions have articulated his administration's civil rights
policy and legislative priorities. The President has also signaled that
he intends to change the tone and tenor of how Washington operates.
To advance the goal of racially integrated education, however, his
words and deeds must clearly establish that educational equity and
201. BERRY, supra note 95, at 335-39.
202. Media Advisory, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, U.S. Civil Rights Commission
Warns that Affirmative Action Might Harm Minority Law Students (Aug. 28, 2007),
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshal/usccr/documents/cr1200710.pdf. See generally
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS: A
BRIEFING BEFORE THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS HELD IN WASHINGTON,
D.C., JUNE 16, 2006 (2007), available at www.usccr.gov/pubs/AALSreport.pdf (concluding
that there is a consensus among experts that there are significant racial disparities in law
school performance but disagreement among them regarding whether affirmative action
alleviates or exacerbates these disparities).
203. BERRY, supra note 95, at 336.
204. Media Advisory, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
Reports that School Districts Obtaining Unitary Status Do Not Exhibit Less Integration
(Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.usccr.gov/press/2007/092707-statreportmedia.pdf; see U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF UNITARY STATUS 75
(2007) [hereinafter BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?], available at http://www.usccr.gov/
pubs/092707_BecomingLessSeparateReport.pdf.
205. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, http://www.usccr.gov/index.html (see links
to "Recent Correspondence" and "Recent Briefing Reports").
206. See RESTORING THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION, supra note 119, at 4 ("Today,
the commission is so debilitated as to be considered moribund.").
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school integration are key priorities on his policy reform agenda. The
President and members of his administration will then need to follow
through on that commitment with specific, targeted, and conscious
efforts in order to reinfuse civil rights objectives into the federal
government's key functions affecting educational opportunity at all
levels. The balance of this Article proposes some initial steps that can
be taken toward that end.
The political, legal, and policy recommendations contained in
this Part of the Article are divided into two sections. The first sets
forth two related proposals to address the hundreds of traditional
school desegregation cases that remain under judicial supervision and
the unknown number of OCR's voluntary school desegregation
agreements that may technically remain under agency supervision.
These suggestions may prove to be controversial among progressives,
but the hope is they can at least spark conversation about how best to
deal with these cases and dormant agreements in a uniform,
responsible, and ethical way. The second section offers a series of
recommendations on how the federal government can help promote
voluntary school integration-not just in the narrow sense of the
term, as it is typically used (i.e., by helping or encouraging school
districts to adopt student assignment methods that promote racial and
ethnic diversity in their schools), but broadly speaking, in all its
forms-in creative ways and across the many contexts and disciplines
that have direct and indirect impacts on public education.
A. The Desegregation Docket
Even among those who may be sympathetic to the cause, these
days there seems to be an acknowledgment that traditional school
desegregation litigation is pass6.2° More than a decade has passed
since the Supreme Court has even bothered to signal that it, too, has
grown weary of these cases.0 8 No one knows the exact number for
sure, but some hundreds of school systems have been declared
unitary in the past (nearly) two decades, 209 and in many of these
207. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
1157, 1157 (2000) ("Today, we commonly define the future of court-ordered school
desegregation as a non-issue: either desegregation cases are dead or, at the very least, the
death knell has sounded."); Ryan, supra note 18, at 251 ("It seems unfashionable these
days, if not atavistic, to talk seriously about the ways to increase racial integration.").
208. Mark V. Tushnet, The "We've Done Enough" Theory of School Desegregation, 39
How. L.J. 767, 767 (1996); see also Parker, supra note 207, at 1174-76 & nn.120-34
(discussing and citing others who have expressed the same view).
209. Considering only those cases in which DOJ was a party, a recent report from the
Civil Rights Commission states that number has dropped from approximately 430 in 2000
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districts, patterns of resegregation have emerged almost overnight.21 °
Despite the large number of unitary status findings, few cases in
recent years have been fully litigated (instead, many are the result of
settlements), and even fewer have been reported in law-making legal
opinions.2 11 The combination of the Supreme Court's vagueness in
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowel212 and
Freeman v. Pitts, 213 and a dearth of recent district and appellate court
guidance on the right standards to apply in unitary status proceedings,
has led to something of an ad hoc approach to school desegregation
cases.
214
To make matters worse, over the past forty years, under no
administration, Democratic or Republican, has DOJ taken a
thoughtful, transparent, comprehensive, and strategic approach to its
school desegregation docket, which apparently includes something in
to 266 as of September 2007. BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?, supra note 204, at 1. An
internal DOJ document listing findings of unitary status between 2007 and 2009 remove
several dozen more from the total. Educational Opportunities Section List of School
Districts Dismissed Since June 28, 2007 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
210. See, e.g., HISTORIC REVERSALS, supra note 1, at 42-44 (tracing post-unitary
status trends toward resegregation in more than two dozen school districts between 1991
and 2005); Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating
Schools: The Retreat from School Desegregation in the South 1990-2000, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION, supra note 18, at 51, 64-66 (discussing the public school resegregation
trends in several districts declared unitary in the 1980s and 1990s).
211. While modifications of existing court orders through negotiation may be common,
I am unaware of any published case from the last decade and a half in which the plaintiffs
have resisted a unitary status finding at full trial, and won. Nor am I aware of any case in
which a court rejected a joint motion for unitary status. Indeed, in one instance, when the
district court partially denied a joint motion for unitary status, the school board won
reversal on appeal. Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 2009 FED App. 0183P, at 2-
18, 566 F.3d 642, 646-57 (6th Cir.).
212. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
213. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). Essentially, Dowell created a three-part test that a defendant
school district had to satisfy in order to attain unitary status: (1) good faith compliance
with the desegregation decree, (2) the elimination of "the vestiges of past discrimination
... to the extent practicable," and (3) a continuing commitment to comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment upon return of local control. 498 U.S. at 247-50. In Freeman, the
Court approved of the notion of "partial" unitary status-where a school system could be
released from its remedial obligations as to parts or aspects of the school system. 503 U.S.
at 490-91. But in reaching its conclusion, the Court also questioned whether existing
patterns of segregation were proximately caused by the constitutional violation and
seemed to demand a greater fit between continuing segregation and the original bad acts
of the school system. See id. at 475-77.
214. See Parker, supra note 207, at 1178-79 ("[T]he Court's legal standards regarding
termination are vague.... An individual [district court] judge's personal preferences can
easily influence the outcome of a pliable test such as that in Dowell."); Monika L. Moore,
Note, Unclear Standards Create an Unclear Future: Developing a Better Definition of
Unitary Status, 112 YALE L.J. 311, 317 (2002) (citing different standards used by different
courts).
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the neighborhood of 250 cases at present. 15 Nor does it seem as
though any administration in recent history has made a serious
attempt to coordinate that litigation with civil rights organizations-
most notably, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund-which serve as
counsel for scores of additional cases on behalf of private plaintiffs.
216
Accordingly, as part of its effort to recommit the federal government
to school integration, the Obama administration should work with the
Educational Opportunities Section of the Civil Rights Division, and
with OCR, to develop a clear philosophy and approach on these
cases. Two related actions that could be taken to resuscitate court-
ordered desegregation are described below.
1. Explicit School Desegregation Guidance and Guidelines
First, OCR and DOJ should provide guidance on preconditions
for unitary status where the Supreme Court has been vague. Recall
that the issuance of similar guidelines had a substantial and positive
impact on desegregation in the late 1960s. Commentators have long
recognized the continuing need for clearer standards that school
districts must meet to attain unitary status,2 17 and some have even
floated proposals for consideration. 218 It may make sense to involve
the academy and civil rights practitioners in developing uniform,
workable standards, but OCR and DOJ should take the lead. Those
two government agencies not only possess the substantive expertise
necessary for such a task, but their leadership would lend credence to
the process and authority to whatever guidelines that emerge from it.
Separate or similar guidelines could be developed through OCR to
address the unknown number of school districts that are technically
still subject to what were once known as "Form 441-B" voluntary
desegregation plans, negotiated by HEW.219 These guidelines-for
215. See supra note 209.
216. For descriptions of LDF's involvement in major civil rights cases, including school
desegregation cases, see generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT:
LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2004); CONSTANCE BAKER
MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 103-202 (1998); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998).
217. See REVIVING THE GOAL, supra note 11, at 31.
218. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 214, at 315-17, 319-23 (citing proposals by others for
clearer standards).
219. See, e.g., BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?, supra note 204, at 12 & n.64 (describing
441-B agreements). School districts that did not operate segregated schools, that
eliminated segregation from their schools, or that entered into voluntary desegregation
plans were required to complete and submit a 441-B Form to HEW to remain eligible for
federal funding. Id. There is little transparency as to the number of districts subject to
these so-called 441-B agreements, and it is also unclear what legal status is afforded to
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both court-ordered districts and the old HEW/OCR districts-could
be used not only internally within the agencies, for the assessment of
active cases on OCR's and DOJ's school desegregation docket, but
also by private plaintiffs in litigating or negotiating with school
districts in cases that do not involve DOJ; by school districts initiating
self-evaluations of their desegregation progress; and potentially even
by the courts in assessing litigation claims and motions for unitary
status.220
What might such standards look like and what issues might they
address? As an initial matter, they should state, based on prior case
law, the specific facets of school operations for which the vestiges of
desegregation must be eliminated "to the extent practicable," under
Dowell.221 Six such areas are predefined in Green,2  but Green
contemplates the possibility of others, and lawyers in other school
desegregation cases have often taken to examining a wide range of
areas in which racial disparities may exist. For instance, school
desegregation cases have examined racial disparities in student
discipline, in enrollment in advanced, gifted, or remedial courses, in
assignment of students to alternative schools, and in the identification
of students for (and in the provision of) special education.23 All of
these, and perhaps others, should be included on the list.
OCR and DOJ should also set forth in the guidelines that the
school district bears the burden of proof, once disparities are
identified, to show that they are not proximately caused by the prior
such plans or whether many of them have been monitored and updated by OCR or
whether they have been largely ignored. OCR under this administration should revisit the
issue and develop a comprehensive approach to deal with these agreements in a way that
provides the school districts subject to them the greatest legal and political flexibility to
advance the goal of integration within the limits of the law.
220. Recall, for instance, the deference that federal courts afforded to HEW's
guidelines in the 1960s. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. Those were
different days and different circumstances, but there is no reason to believe that a similar
approach could not be taken today.
221. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
222. The "Green factors" include: (1) student assignment, (2) faculty assignment, (3)
staff assignment, (4) facilities, (5) transportation, and (6) extracurricular activities. Green
v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1967).
223. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Madison County, 517 F.3d 292,298-303 (5th Cir.
2008) (reviewing school programs for factors such as student assignment, faculty, staff,
transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities); Lee v. Roanoke City Bd. of Educ.,
No. 3:70-cv-855-MHT, 2007 WL 1196482, at *4-7 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2007) (analyzing
procedures implemented for student discipline, drop-out intervention, and special
education); Harris v. Crenshaw County Bd. of Educ., No. 2:66CV2455-MHT, 2006 WL
2590592, at *3-5 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 11, 2006) (considering such factors as student
assignment, instruction, and graduation rates).
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de jure discrimination and segregation. Making explicit the rebuttable
presumption that existing disparities are related to prior bad acts is
helpful because courts have not always been clear which party bears
that burden,224 and placing it on the school district has a basis in the
case law.225 Moreover, given the difficulty of proving proximate cause,
placing the burden on the school district is a fair but remedy-
maximizing interpretation of the law.
Beyond identifying these discrete areas that should be examined
for racial disparities, a new set of guidelines from the federal
government should also address how to treat demographic changes.
There may very well be a handful of school districts under court order
that have not changed much since the school desegregation case
against it was filed, but they are probably few in number. Most have
undergone vast changes. Nationally, whereas, in 1968, Whites made
up eighty percent of public school students and Blacks were the
dominant minority at fourteen percent,226 today, Whites comprise
only 56.5% of the public school population and the largest minority
group is comprised of Latino students, at 20.5%.227 Insofar as some
dormant, decades-old desegregation orders no longer reflect the
communities they are intended to serve, OCR and DOJ should define
how the desegregation orders will be treated. Perhaps, again, there is
a legal basis to place the burden on school districts to account for
disparities between Whites and racial minorities who were not part of
the original order. Even if not, perhaps the guidelines can provide an
opportunity and mechanism for either DOJ or private plaintiffs to
intervene in an ongoing case to present additional evidence as to why
current patterns of segregation or other racial disparities are
proximately caused by the same prior acts that gave rise to the case or
224. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 207, at 1205 ("The orders required that the parties
show cause why the school districts should not be declared unitary and the cases
dismissed." (describing orders issued by two judges in the Middle District of Alabama));
accord, Parker, supra note 147, at 188 (same).
225. Freeman, for example, suggests that current conditions of school segregation can
be assumed to be proximately caused by the school district's prior de jure discrimination
and segregation, but that such a presumption can be rebutted by evidence of demographic
changes that have taken place over the years unrelated to that unconstitutional conduct.
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 475-77 (1992). In Jenkins, the Supreme Court seemed to
imply further that school districts were only obligated to remedy the incremental portion
of a racial disparity that could be tied to their prior de jure discrimination and segregation.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101-02 (1995).
226. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (HARVARD),
RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 13 (2006)
[hereinafter RACIAL TRANSFORMATION], available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla
.edu/research/desegRacial Transformation.pdf (reporting 1968 data).
227. REVIVING THE GOAL, supra note 11, at 11 (2006-07 school year data).
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subsequent acts by the school district that also violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. If successful in doing so, such a conclusion could
provide additional legal justification for more aggressive judicial
remedies or negotiated settlements.
Lastly, the guidelines should somehow address one of the most
pressing issues advocates have identified-namely, that unitary status
is often followed by immediate racial resegregation.228 To do so, they
could require the court or the parties, first, to determine what
desegregative student assignment strategies the school district in
question employs (e.g., satellite zones, race-conscious magnet schools,
a minority-to-majority program, school pairings, etc.), and, second, to
assess how attainment of unitary status will likely affect the continued
use of these strategies. If it appears that there is a threat of substantial
resegregation, or even if not, the school district should be called upon
to explain, under the "continuing good faith compliance" prong of the
Dowell test, how it intends to continue to assign students in a way that
guarantees the government (and/or private plaintiffs) and the
community that it has an ongoing commitment to avoid racial
isolation and to promote racial integration while complying with the
Constitution and requirements set forth in Parents Involved. The
guidelines should also establish the presumption that districts may
continue to use certain student assignment strategies established
under court order, such as satellite zones or school pairings, beyond
the order's dissolution, on the theory that even though they were
initially adopted with the goal of facilitating desegregation, they have
since become institutionalized, and that changing them would not
only disrupt existing school feeding patterns but also knowingly
recreate racially segregated conditions.229 Such assurance from the
guidelines might give some school districts comfort that they can exist
in a post-unitary status world without completely altering something
that works well as is.2
30
228. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
229. Justice Kennedy suggests that some such strategies are consistent with
constitutional obligations, and indeed may not even be subject to strict scrutiny. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
230. It is something of an open question how courts should treat race-conscious
remedies contained in a unitary status settlement, since technically, if the district is
declared unitary, the old court order no longer provides the same constitutional cover.
The guidelines, therefore, might also offer some guidance on this issue and state the
authority under which the agreement can be enforced.
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2. Comprehensive Review of the Federal Government's School
Desegregation Docket
A second, related proposal for handling the 250 or so cases
currently on DOJ's docket may prove more controversial. There is a
sense among civil rights advocates that the continued existence of
school desegregation orders is a good thing, and that DOJ and private
plaintiffs should do what they can to resist dissolution, the idea being
that a court order can provide cover for actions that the school board
can take or be required to take that it otherwise would not be allowed
to take in the absence of a court order."' In theory, that is certainly
true, as Parents Involved made plain: once a district is unitary, the
judicial scrutiny applied to its racial integration efforts is intense. Yet,
anecdotally, it seems few plaintiffs have actively relied on court
orders or consent decrees to continue to press for further integration
or desegregation, and some communities subject to them do not even
know they exist.232 As Wendy Parker put it, "most [school
desegregation] cases suffer from extreme neglect-little activity will
occur for years, if not decades, but the court-ordered remedies remain
in place."233
If the Obama administration is serious about pursuing
integration in public schools, then perhaps it should give serious
consideration to making better use of the school desegregation cases
to which the government is a party. The perception until now has
been that DOJ takes a reactive stance to desegregation, and that its
litigation activities for much of the past several decades lacked
transparency.234 Indeed, until the Civil Rights Commission issued its
2007 report on desegregation, it was unclear to most observers how
many cases the government had on its docket, how many of them
were active, and which school systems the government's caseload
231. See, e.g., LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 38-39 (urging DOJ to declare
districts unitary only after it is clear that they will remain integrated even after receiving
post-unitary status); HISTORIC REVERSALS, supra note 1, at 48 ("Communities still under
court order should exercise the greatest caution in ending their court orders since such
moves could strip local authorities of any right to take actions they believe to be needed to
address racial separation and prepare their students for living and working in a multiracial
community.").
232. BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?, supra note 204, at 12 (stating that even some school
districts do not know of or understand the scope of the court orders that bind them).
233. Parker, supra note 207, at 1160.
234. Immediately upon assuming office, President Obama promised transparency into
the workings of the federal government. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On First Day, Obama
Quickly Sets New Tone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at Al (" 'Transparency and rule of law
will be the touchstones of this presidency.' " (quoting President Obama)).
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covered.235 In response to the Commission's inquiries, however, the
Civil Rights Division's Educational Opportunities Section provided
not only information about the cases on its docket but also data
revealing that "[s]ince FY 2000, the DOJ has actively pursued the
closure of school desegregation cases. ' 23 6 Between 1999 and 2007, it
initiated 265 desegregation case reviews, resulting in 178 findings of
unitary status.237 In other words, in exercising its caretaker duties
monitoring these cases, DOJ under Bush II was also swiftly shuffling
the school districts toward unitary status.
238
One might think that the alternative approach would be to
protect these court orders and to return to a sort of "let sleeping dogs
lie" strategy. But that approach also would not do much to
affirmatively advance civil rights or racial integration in a meaningful
way, especially if many of these court orders have languished and
become irrelevant, or worse, gone unnoticed by the very communities
they are supposed to serve. Rather than deal only with those cases
that have been awoken by a court or a private party, DOJ should
instead continue to revisit these cases in a systematic and uniform
way-as it apparently did under Bush II-but do so based on the
guidance that it develops together with OCR, with an eye toward
finding workable, sustainable, and constitutional integrative solutions.
Proceeding proactively in this way need not mean immediately
negotiating unitary status for every school district in question, as
integration advocates may fear. But it would mean that there is a
possibility that the government would be negotiating the terms of an
eventual dissolution of the order, if DOJ finds that the school district
has indeed met all of its constitutional obligations.
While there is that risk, the benefits could significantly outweigh
it. First, something is better than nothing. If a community is not using
the cover that a court order provides it, and indeed no one really even
knows it exists, then what good does it actually serve? Revisiting the
order allows the government an opportunity to conduct site visits,
meet with the community and with school district officials, and do a
thorough, on-the-ground assessment of the continuing racial
235. BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?, supra note 204, at 23-28 (describing the number of
cases for which DOJ is responsible, and the actions it has taken in recent years on these
cases).
236. Id. at 28.
237. Id. at 25, 27.
238. While this time period includes a small portion of the Clinton presidency, these
statistics are the best available on the Educational Opportunity Section's actions during
the Bush II presidency.
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disparities and school segregation, and strategize with key
stakeholders about how best to address them given the school
district's continuing constitutional obligations.
Second, if the guidelines discussed above are properly designed,
the government's case review would be comprehensive and uniform,
and it would be conducted at the government's initiation and on the
government's terms, rather than at a school district's, court's, or third
party intervenor's behest. Such a posture allows the government to
establish its goals proactively, use its own metrics to evaluate the
efforts of the school districts in meeting their obligations, and-
because many of these cases do not end up going to a hearing
anyway-negotiate the best possible integration-maximizing result for
all of the parties involved.
Third, negotiating a modified order or, if appropriate, terms for
the eventual dissolution of a court order can allow for concessions
from a defendant school district that may not have been possible if
the case were litigated. For example, given the stringent standards for
proximate cause under Freeman and Missouri v. Jenkins,23 9 it is quite
unlikely that a court will find disparities in achievement, in
assignment, or in discipline in existence today that are traceable to
constitutional violations that occurred decades prior. However, a
district might be willing to agree to take concrete steps toward
progress in those areas, and a court might be willing to approve a
stipulation that includes such relief on the ground that the parties
have made reasonable calculations as to the likelihood of success at
trial and decided that the concessions by both sides in the settlement
fairly recognize those risks.24
Fourth, should any such negotiated, post-unitary status
agreement containing some race-conscious elements be challenged by
a dissatisfied parent in the future, the hope is that a court evaluating
its validity may find multiple justifications for it, such as: (1) vestiges
of any remaining duties to eliminate de jure segregation;2 41 (2)
239. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). An integration-maximizing interpretation of the standards for
a judicial finding of proximate cause that current disparities are linked to prior
unconstitutional actions are discussed supra note 225.
240. It is also often assumed, incorrectly, that school districts are either actively seeking
or at least interested in achieving unitary status, but, in fact, many school districts are
content to remain under court order for extrajudicial reasons. See BECOMING LESS
SEPARATE?, supra note 204, at 13-14; Parker, supra note 207, at 1212-13.
241. An unexplored issue is this: Dowell continues the constitutional remedial duty
until the vestiges of the prior segregation are eliminated "to the extent practicable." Bd. of
Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991). But surely there might
still be vestiges of that prior segregation for which it is not "practicable" to order
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demonstration of continuing commitment to sustain gains obtained
while under court order; and (3) pursuit of the compelling interest of
racially integrated education as established in Parents Involved. And,
because both (or in some cases, several) parties will have agreed to
any negotiated settlement, the parties will be in the position of
working together to defend the agreement, should the court or an
intervenor raise questions.
Revisiting cases in a systematic and uniform way, whether or not
already awoken by another party, has other benefits as well. It could
significantly reduce the costs of litigation to both the school district
and the government. It also moves negotiations, initially, outside of
the adversarial context of litigation. And it may allow for more
flexibility and community involvement than the litigation model
might otherwise permit. Further, the federal government may call
upon certain resources that are well-suited to facilitate the process.
Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing
regulations, the government created two agencies in the 1960s that
remain in existence today: the Desegregation Assistance Centers
(now called Equity Assistance Centers ("EACs")) in the Department
of Education and the Community Relations Service ("CRS") in the
Department of Justice. 42 The EACs and CRS have relatively modest
annual budgets-about $7 million and $10 million, respectively-and
while they have both served important functions in the past,243 their
roles have not been as well-defined in recent years.2" That said, given
continuing constitutional remedies. A good example might be patterns of segregation that
are attributable in part to past de jure segregation and in part to demographic changes.
Should not the Constitution allow a school district to try, voluntarily, to cure such
disparities if it so chooses?
242. There are ten regional EACs across the country, which "provide assistance in the
areas of race, gender, and national origin equity to public school districts to promote equal
educational opportunities." United States Department of Education, Training and
Advisory Services Equity Assistance Centers, http://www.ed.gov/programs/equitycenters/
contacts.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010). CRS has ten regional offices and four field
offices, and is a " 'peacemaker' for community conflicts and tensions arising from
differences of race, color, and national origin." United States Department of Justice,
Community Relations Service, http://www.usdoj.gov/crs/map.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2010).
243. See, e.g., BETRAM LEVINE, RESOLVING RACIAL CONFLICT: THE COMMUNITY
RELATIONS SERVICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1964-1989, at 155-80 (2005) (describing the
role that CRS played in addressing the violence that erupted following Judge Garrity's
1974 Boston school desegregation ruling).
244. An article written about the CRS in 1993, for example, reported: "Even some
people in the Department of Justice don't know of CRS's existence. When a reporter
called the department, a Justice spokesman said he had never heard of CRS." Mark
Curriden, Settling Racial Conflicts Is CRS Goak Little-Known Division of Justice
Dispatched to Resolve School Bus Dispute, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 34, 34.
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their charge, expertise, historical importance, and connections to and
work with the communities in which they operate, these agencies may
be perfectly positioned to assist OCR and the Educational
Opportunities Section of DOJ with its school desegregation docket
and the old 441-B agreements. A new administration and new
leadership provide an ideal opportunity to rethink the mission and
work of these agencies. Any comprehensive strategy to deal with the
federal government's desegregation docket, therefore, should
contemplate the role that CRS and the EACs can play in that process.
The sad reality is that the law is stacked against school
desegregation plaintiffs. Given the state of the law and the general
resistance of the federal judiciary to continued supervision, it is hard
to imagine what kind of conditions a court would need to find to
reject, outright, a school district's request for unitary status and order
more aggressive relief. Under these conditions, whatever benefit
there may be to minority students and parents to know that a
dormant court order exists in their school district is limited. On the
other hand, by reviving desegregation cases and using them to focus
school districts on existing racial disparities, these cases may still
serve some good. The Obama administration, therefore, should give
serious consideration to a more proactive approach to the hundreds
of desegregation cases for which it is responsible.
B. Affirmative Strategies
Despite the large number of school desegregation cases that
remain on the books, these cases do not cover the vast majority of
school districts in the nation, and the United States Supreme Court
has already declared that their reach and duration is limited, as is the
relief that can be achieved through them.245 Thus, an administration
committed to educational equity and integrated schooling cannot rely
on reviving that docket alone to make much progress. Instead, it
245. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100-02 (1995) (holding that a district court
exceeded its authority when it ordered a remedy that sought to improve urban schools to
the point where they could draw Whites from the surrounding areas to return them
voluntarily); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 475-77 (1992) (stating that school districts are
not responsible for demographic changes that lacked a causal relationship to the original
constitutional violation); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
247-50 (1991) (holding that school districts can be released from their obligations with
reasonable compliance with prior orders and when a court deems the vestiges of
discrimination eliminated "to the extent practicable"); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,




should put the bulk of its resources behind political, legislative, and
policy efforts and to coordinating federal agency functions that
promote racial integration and equity.
1. Reframing the School Integration Debate and Advancing
Research to Support It
For much of the past several decades, advocates of school
integration have been playing defense under Republican and
Democratic administrations alike. If President Obama is to advance
an agenda that prioritizes racially integrated public education, he
must begin with clear and forceful words. He must remind his
colleagues in Congress and the nation at large that it is an issue of
pedagogy and of civil rights, and that civil rights, properly
understood, have historically been and should return to being a
bipartisan issue, not a liberal or Democratic issue. Nor is integrated
education a 1960s issue. All Americans, be they White or non-White,
rich, middle-class, or poor, from the Left or from the Right, in cities,
suburbs, or rural regions of the country, should support the rigorous
enforcement of civil rights laws. Obama must make clear that
Brown's vision of equal, integrated public schools continues to be
relevant and critical to the health and prosperity of our democracy.
Indeed, as our nation has become more racially and ethnically
diverse, and our society more global than ever, Brown's goal is only
more compelling. Yet, by so many measures, the nation is moving
farther away from making it a reality. The current administration
must employ the federal agencies and urge Congress and the nation
as a whole to work together to fully support affirmative efforts, within
the limits of the law, to promote equality of opportunity for all
students and greater racial and ethnic integration in our public
schools.246
Some immediate steps to demonstrate a commitment to racially
integrated education might include, for example, engaging the
Department of Education to educate the public about the benefits of
integration and the harms of racial isolation. Public opinion polls
conducted after the Supreme Court decision in Parents Involved that
measured the public's support for racial integration at the K-12 level
246. One small window that the President had to make such a forceful statement has
closed. In Obama's first national address as President on education issues, he neglected to
mention anything about integration or Brown's promise, instead focusing primarily on
charter schools, accountability, early childhood education, and merit-pay for teachers. See
David Stout, Obama Outlines Plan for Education Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at
A14.
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are somewhat deceiving, with results varying significantly depending
on how the question was asked.2 47 But this variance suggests that
many people can still be convinced of its benefits if they are better
informed. Public education and messaging, therefore, are key. A
substantial body of research already exists from which the federal
government can draw,248 but its reach does not extend to those who
work and write outside the halls of universities, where the research is
conducted and discussed, or the courtrooms, where these matters are
sometimes litigated. Intuitively, diversity in classrooms makes sense.
If this administration wants to take integrated schooling seriously, it
should use the resources of the federal government to digest the
research already available that confirms this intuition and help the
public better understand it.
Beyond sharing and democratizing knowledge that already
exists, the current administration should also help researchers
develop more of it. As much as is known about race and schooling
today, there remains much more to know. The nation's demographics
have shifted radically since the 1950s and 1960s, when the
foundational research was conducted on the harms of racial isolation.
Today, not only are there far more students of non-White
backgrounds in public school, these students represent diversity on
many other fronts too-language, class, ethnicity, religion, and
culture.249 Issues of integration and isolation are increasingly layered,
with some students facing segregation, for example, by race and
poverty, as well as language.250 The difficulties faced are also vastly
247. When asked, "As you may know, the Supreme Court recently ruled that public
schools may not consider an individual's race when deciding which students are assigned
to specific schools. Do you agree or disagree with this ruling?," seventy-one percent of
respondents approved of the decision and twenty-four percent disapproved. Public
Opinion Poll, Quinnipiac University, Voters Back Supreme Court Limit on School Deseg
3-1 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1295.xml?ReleaselD=1093. However,
when asked, "As you may know, the Supreme Court recently restricted how local school
boards can use race to assign children to schools. Some argue (this is a significant setback
for efforts to diversify public schools), others say (race should not be used in school
assignments). On balance, do you approve or disapprove of this decision?," forty percent
of respondents approved and fifty-six disapproved. Public Opinion Poll, Washington Post-
ABC News, News Poll (July 30, 2007), http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/ssi/polls/postpoll_072307.html.
248. See, e.g., Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908
& 05-915) (citing work of social scientists supporting goals of racial integration and the
reduction of racial isolation).
249. See generally RACIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 226 (examining the
transformation of racial composition in the nation's schools).
250. See generally id. (examining the changing patterns of segregation in American
public schools).
[Vol. 88
RACIALLY INTEGRA TED EDUCATION
different in cities and in suburbs, for the West and for the South. The
questions are many: public schools find themselves constantly
struggling with which training, teaching, and learning methods are
most effective (and for whom). To be sure, some of this thinking is
already being done by innovative teachers and researchers, and
funded by private foundations,25 but there is no reason why the
government should not only participate but also lead the charge. The
current administration, therefore, can help coordinate public and
private groups to develop a research agenda and execute it in ways
that inform public policy and, if necessary, litigation.252 Planning and
conducting this research will take time, but the President should
immediately call for a renewed commitment to using the resources
and the bullhorn of the federal government to realize the promise of
Brown.
2. Undoing Obstacles to Effective Civil Rights Enforcement and
Integration Innovation
President Obama must also signal a change from the perceived
politicized and partisan culture of Washington, especially in those
federal agencies with influence over education and civil rights policy
that should function without political influence. Top on the list for de-
politicization is DOJ.253 Detailed reports issued in 2008 by DOJ's
Office of the Inspector General and Office of Professional
Responsibility set forth proposals that the current administration
should review and, as appropriate, implement to restore confidence,
integrity, and fairness to that critical law-enforcement agency.254
These recommendations should be given serious consideration.
Obama and the Attorney General must follow through with their
unequivocal statements that ideological screening for career positions
within DOJ-or anywhere else in the federal government, for that
251. For example, several of the sources cited in this Article that pertain to the benefits
of racial integration are produced by The Civil Rights ProjectlProyecto Derechos Civiles,
and funded by private philanthropy groups like the Ford Foundation and the Open
Society Institute. See, e.g., Ford Foundation, http://fordfound.org/; Open Society Initiative
& Soros Foundations Network, http://www.soros.org; The Civil Rights Project/Proyecto
Derechos Civiles (UCLA), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu.
252. REVIVING THE GOAL, supra note 11, at 30 (citing the need for "basic research,
and for new thought about race and schooling" and recommending that federal agencies
work together with private groups such as the National Academy of Education and the
American Educational Research Association).
253. See Carrie Johnson, Obama Team Faces Major Task in Justice Dept. Overhaul:
Goal Is to Restore Confidence in Law Enforcement Actions, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2008, at
A2 ("Political considerations affected every crevice of the [DOJ] during the Bush years.").
254. See policy recommendations in sources cited supra note 150.
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matter-is a thing of the past. 5 There must be no screens to enlist
conservatives in career civil servant posts, but nor can there be similar
screens to hire or promote only liberals in such positions. The goal of
DOJ is the administration of justice, and, as such, the primary
qualification to serve as a career employee there should be an interest
to enforce the laws and to perform the functions of the position
professionally and ethically, under the leadership of those who are
and should be politically appointed.256
In addition, the President and his administration should move
quickly to reverse those policies the Bush II administration put into
place that undermine civil rights enforcement, 57 or as related to issues
of integrated schooling, that stifle innovation and the development of
constitutionally sound practices of local communities and school
districts. The Department of Education and its Office for Civil Rights
can begin this process by withdrawing or amending the "Dear
Colleague" letters that it issued in the waning days under Bush II.
With regard to the two letters that purport to provide guidance on the
consideration of race in K-12 student assignment and in higher
education admissions, any revision should more accurately describe
the law. It should also actively encourage, rather than discourage,
school districts and institutions to explore legally permissible
strategies that expand educational opportunities and expose students
to diverse educational settings. To be sure, those strategies that do
take race into account must satisfy the obligations of strict scrutiny.
But race-conscious efforts to expand equal educational opportunity
255. In his confirmation hearing, for instance, Eric Holder stated: " 'Law enforcement
decisions and personnel actions must be untainted by partisanship.' ... 'Under my
stewardship, the Department of Justice will serve justice, not the feeling interests of any
political party.' "Josh Meyer, Holder Calls Waterboarding Torture; Obama's Nominee for
Attorney General Promises Big Changes at 'Badly Shaken' Justice Department, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A10; accord Carrie Johnson, Waterboarding Is Torture, Holder
Tells Senators; Justice Dept. Nominee Rejects Policies of Bush Era but Stresses
Bipartisanship, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2009, at A2 (quoting Holder as describing the
partisan conduct in DOJ under Bush II as " 'appalling,'" and stating that he would
"closely examine [its] record on civil rights enforcement").
256. See generally Kennedy, supra note 153, at 227-36 (suggesting steps the new
administration should take to rebuild and strengthen the Civil Rights Division).
257. See Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Under Obama Is Preparing for Doctrinal Shift in
Policies of Bush Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, at A14 ("[T]here were expectations that
the [Civil Rights D]ivision would be restored to its historic role of largely enforcing
prohibitions against racial and ethnic discrimination. Under the Bush administration, the
division significantly diminished its involvement in those areas and shifted resources to




are by no means per se invalid,258 and OCR should offer its technical
assistance to entities that contemplate employing such means to make
sure that they are used in ways consistent with the law. Moreover,
OCR leadership should also reexamine its existing docket of technical
assistance reviews and its affirmative compliance reviews to
determine which, if any, were ideologically motivated; any such
investigations or reviews should be approached with a more balanced
eye and, if appropriate, brought to a responsible and ethical close.
3. Reframing School Choice: NCLB, Charters, and Magnets
For decades, national as well as local educational policy have
been obsessed with school choice as part of the solution to society's
educational ills,259 and the Bush 1I administration raised the stakes by
expanding public school choice options. NCLB provides students in
failing schools the right, theoretically, to transfer elsewhere.26 °
Charter schools, an increasingly popular alternative to traditional
public schools, have also expanded their reach under Bush II, and the
early signals from the Obama administration suggest that their
growth will continue.261 Meanwhile, the federal magnet schools
program, now nearly four decades old, continues to purport to offer
unique curricula and exposure to greater student diversity, even as
that latter promise has been diluted over the years.2 62 With regard to
each of these choice options, however, the federal government has
taken a weak and somewhat counterproductive stance toward
integration. This must change under new leadership. A full discussion
of the shortcomings and possible reforms to NCLB, charters, and
magnets is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is clear that
proposed reforms must eliminate the perverse incentives that these
school choice mechanisms create and replace them with positive ones.
NCLB, for example, does not have any structures in place to
encourage integrative transfers or discourage segregative ones, and,
as a result, commentators have noted that it can and has contributed
258. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788-89
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
259. See Frankenberg & Le, supra note 132, at 1041-45.
260. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
261. In his testimony before the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees, for
example, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan stated the Department of Education's
intention to double charter school funding over the next four years. Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 461 (2009) (statement of Arne
Duncan, Sec'y of Educ.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2010 happ-lab-5&docid=f:50763.pdf#page=467.
262. Frankenberg & Le, supra note 132, at 1056-59.
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to greater racial isolation.263 Indeed, not only does the text of NCLB
itself lack such positive incentives, but a "Dear Colleague" letter
issued by OCR under Bush II explicitly rejects any interpretation of
NCLB that would allow school districts to harmonize their voluntary
integration efforts with the statute if doing so would limit the transfer
option in any way."6 Even if NCLB did include some integration
incentives, its transfer provisions remain severely underutilized (only
about one percent of students eligible for transfers appear to use
them),265 and they also fail to provide for or encourage the movement
of students between districts, thus greatly reducing their effectiveness
as a possible integration tool.2" The evidence on student diversity in
charters is also mixed, but on the whole, it appears they do not tend
to be centers of racial or socioeconomic integration either.2 67 Lastly,
though certainly the most effective of the three in promoting
integration, magnets in recent years are also increasingly less
successful at achieving meaningful levels of integration, despite their
origins as an explicit desegregation tool.
268
Given these realities, the current administration should actively
seek to develop regulations, legislative revisions, and policy positions
that create positive, integration-encouraging incentives, within the
limits of the law. For Bush II's Department of Education, the policy
message seemed to be that school choice, whatever form it took, was
unambiguously a good thing, with little regard for what kind of
263. See, e.g., Jennifer Jellison Holme & Amy Stuart Wells, School Choice Beyond
District Borders: Lessons for Reauthorization of NCLB from Interdistrict Desegregation
and Open Enrollment Plans, in IMPROVING ON No CHILD LEFT BEHIND: GETTING
EDUCATION REFORM BACK ON TRACK 139,139-54 (Richard Kahlenberg ed., 2008).
264. See Letter from Stephanie J. Monroe, supra note 181.
265. GEORGES VERNEZ ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE No
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT: VOL. VII-TITLE I SCHOOL CHOICE AND SUPPLEMENTAL
EDUCATION SERVICES: FINAL REPORT 1-2 (2009), www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2009/
RANDRP1383.sum.pdf.
266. Losen, supra note 173, at 289 ("[N]o school districts are required to receive
students attending failing schools from other districts, and the law's structure allows for,
but does not encourage (by money grant or other incentives) inter-district transfers.").
267. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT
(HARVARD), CHARTER SCHOOLS AND RACE: A LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR INTEGRATED
EDUCATION (2003), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Charter
_Schools03.pdf. 3-48; INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, FAILED PROMISES: ASSESSING
CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES 3-15 (2008), available at
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/2-Charter-Report-Final.pdf; Amy Stuart
Wells et al., Charter Schools and Racial and Social Class Segregation: Yet Another Sorting
Machine?, in A NOTION AT RISK: PRESERVING PUBLIC EDUCATION AS AN ENGINE FOR
SOCIAL MOBILITY 169, 172 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2000).
268. Frankenberg & Le, supra note 132, at 1045-55.
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schools resulted from it. 269 This hands-off governmental stance toward
school choice, however, allows it to be used in ways that undermine
Brown's promise. The Department of Education, therefore, in
addition to withdrawing or revising any OCR guidance that
incentivizes resegregation, should direct OCR to affirmatively offer
its technical assistance to school districts that wish to take steps to
promote greater integration-again, in ways consistent with the law.
Further, if the current administration intends to stand behind
NCLB's transfer provisions as an appropriate way to address "failing
schools," then it should make sure that the opportunities to transfer
are meaningful, and not illusory. Seats must be made available in
eligible receiving schools and information must be properly
distributed to all parents of students entitled to a transfer. Beyond
that, the government should provide incentives to encourage
interdistrict NCLB transfer opportunities and promote greater
cooperation between and among neighboring school districts,
especially at the borders along which substantial residential
segregation exists. If additional federal money is made available for
charter schools under the current administration, then recipients of
those funds, too, should be asked to take affirmative steps to attract a
diverse body of teachers and students, as magnet schools are expected
to do, and to comply with state laws requiring greater racial
integration in charter schools.
270
As it revamps the landscape of school choice, the current
administration can do more to elevate the status of magnet schools as
an important contributor to the patchwork of options available to
parents and students. Although charter schools have gotten most of
the attention under the Obama administration so far, magnet schools
currently enroll twice as many students and offer many of the same
269. Consider the various Web site resources that were created under Bush II and that
remain active today. See, e.g., United States Department of Education, Building Choice,
http://buildingchoice.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) ("This website is designed to help
implement and maintain public school choice programs."); United States Department of
Education, Choices for Parents, http://www.ed.gov/nclb/choice/index.html (last visited
Feb. 13, 2010) (describing and providing hyperlinks to investigate "the full range of
choices" provided for under NCLB).
270. See ERICA FRANKENBERG & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES (UCLA), THE FORGOTTEN CHOICE?
RETHINKING MAGNET SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 15 (2008),
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/magnet/the-forgotten-choice-rethinking-
magnet schools.pdf (noting that few states have racial or socioeconomic integration
requirements for charter schools); Susan Eaton & Gina Chirichigno, Op-Ed, Charters
Must Commit to Diversity, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 2009, at C9 (urging federal funds
directed to charters to include integration goals).
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things that charters do, and more.27' Properly imagined, they provide
specialized curricula and programs, include free transportation, draw
a diverse core of teachers and administrators, and offer the
opportunity to learn in an integrated educational setting. 72 To the
extent that some magnet schools are not actually doing these things,
or are not doing them well, the federal government should pour its
resources into making them better, not drain funds away to fund
other less-tested programs that may not hold the same promise that
magnets do.273
Finally, across all of its school choice programs, the federal
government should be mindful of incentivizing meaningful choice that
expands the opportunity of students to learn in integrated educational
environments. Because substantially more school segregation exists
between school districts than within them,274 encouraging more
interdistrict magnet schools, creating opportunities for interdistrict
NCLB transfers, and facilitating the creation of charter schools that
draw students from more than one school district are all important
strategies to increase the reach of school integration. Despite recent
backsliding, the South-where courts have most actively supervised
desegregation litigation, and where many metropolitan-wide school
systems exist-has been the nation's leader in school desegregation
for much of the past four decades. 75 Meanwhile, the Northeast and
Midwest-where there has been much less court-ordered school
desegregation activity, and where there can sometimes be dozens of
small school systems in a single metropolitan area-have been the
most segregated regions in the country.276 We can learn from our
desegregation experience in the South that greater regional
cooperation, whether through interdistrict programs or through
actual school district consolidation, creates more opportunities for
meaningful integration.
4. Promoting Smart School District Consolidation
Facilitating student mobility between districts is one way to get at
the problem that much of the existing segregation can be found
271. FRANKENBERG & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 270, at 15.
272- Id. at 47-51.
273. For some suggestions on magnet school reform, see id. at 47-51; Frankenberg &
Le, supra note 132, at 1064-69.
274. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 59-74 (2004); Reardon & Yun, supra note 210, at 51-69.
275. CLOTFELTER, supra note 274, at 56-57.
276. Id.; Frankenberg & Le, supra note 132, at 1027-29 (discussing the changing nature
of school segregation and citing sources).
776 [Vol. 88
RACIALLY INTEGRA TED EDUCATION
between and not within school districts. But another is simply
attempting to erase the lines that divide racially and
socioeconomically distinct communities altogether. Different state
governments have tried, at times, to require school district
consolidation, usually for fiscal and administrative reasons,277 and
certainly these efforts have been met with some resistance (especially
from smaller rural communities), 278 but it is not entirely clear whether
there has ever been a substantial federal effort to facilitate that
objective on a broad scale, or even to have federal education officials
participate in the consolidation conversation. Yet, school district
consolidation can be an attractive possibility as a means of increasing
school integration because its fiscal benefits may prove attractive to
those who would otherwise be indifferent to the integration
opportunities it can provide.
In this fiscally challenged climate, consolidation could prove an
attractive solution to state budgets at the local level. The Department
of Education under the Obama administration, therefore, should give
serious consideration to throwing the weight of the federal
government, strategically, behind consolidation that serves important
national educational objectives as well. Research is required to better
understand the possible benefits and costs of consolidation,279 and the
best political and legislative strategies. The White House's domestic
policy team is well situated to initiate, coordinate, and conduct the
initial feasibility assessments. While consolidation, in the abstract, has
277. See, e.g., Marvin E. Dodson III & Thomas A. Garrett, Inefficient Education
Spending in Public School Districts: A Case for Consolidation, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y
270, 270-79 (2004) (estimating the economies of scale for consolidation of school districts
in Arkansas and concluding that consolidation would result in significant cost savings).
The Maine legislature, for instance, enacted school reorganization legislation that requires
a massive restructuring of the school districts in the state, with the goal of reducing the
total number of districts from about 290 to no more than eighty, each with at least 2,500
students (barring a few exceptions). The reorganization was set to be complete by July 1,
2009. See Maine Department of Education, Summary of the Reorganization Law,
http://www.maine.gov/education/reorg/lawsummary.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, Governor Ed Rendell is trying to convince the legislature to
consider a bill that consolidates the state's 500 school districts into about 100. See, e.g.,
Amy Worden, Mario F. Cattabiani & Angela Couloumbis, Rendell's Budget Up, but No
Big Tax Hikes, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 2,2009, at Al.
278. See, e.g., Shrinking Pains, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2008, at 49, 49 (discussing the
concern of certain rural school districts following passage of South Dakota's school district
consolidation law).
279. Just as there may be non-fiscal benefits to consolidation, so too might there be
social and political costs. See Thomas L. Asbury & Nanci L. Shaw, Policy Implications for
Social Justice in School District Consolidation, 4 LEADERSHIP POL'Y SCHS. 105, 105-26
(2005).
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long been desired by integration advocates,2 80 not enough thought has
been given to using the government's resources to encourage what
has normally been thought of as a state and local activity. This
administration may provide an opportunity to do just that.
5. Prioritizing Fair Housing and Housing Integration Initiatives
Researchers have long recognized the enduring but complicated
relationship between residential segregation and school
segregation."' Because the vast majority of school districts assign
students to public schools based on where they live, public policy and
private acts and "choices" that result in residentially segregated
housing patterns are reflected in segregated schools. To the extent
that enforcement of fair housing laws can have a dramatic impact on
where people live, they can also affect where children go to school.
Under the Fair Housing Act of 1968,282 the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") is responsible for
conducting impartial investigations of fair housing complaints
through its administrative processes,283 and the Civil Rights Division
of DOJ (specifically, the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section) is
granted broad authority to initiate or intervene in litigation that raises
issues of general public importance involving charges of systematic
housing discrimination.2 84 Yet, according to a December 2008 report
of the National Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,
during the Bush II administration, HUD issued charges in
substantially fewer fair housing cases, and DOJ enforcement of fair
280. See, e.g., Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Educational
Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827, 880-81 (1998)
(observing that resistance to consolidation is "a root cause of racial imbalance in the [New
Jersey] schools"); Amy Stuart Wells, Op-Ed, Standards Can't Make Separate Equal, New
Commissioner of Education Should Focus on Our Still-Segregated Schools, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 2, 2009, at A35 (suggesting consolidation of "some of Long Island's tiny and thus
costly school districts" as a way of achieving greater integration).
281. See, e.g., Brief of Housing Scholars and Research & Advocacy Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915); Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence
of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation and School Segregation, in IN
PURSUIT OF A DREAM DEFERRED: LINKING HOUSING AND EDUCATION POLICY 89, 89-
120 (john a. powell, Gavin Kearney & Vina Kay eds., 2001).
282. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 363 (2006).
283. §§ 3608, 3610.
284. See § 3614; 28 C.F.R. § 0.50(a) (vesting the Civil Rights Division with power to
enforce "all Federal statutes affecting civil rights" on behalf of the government); United
States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Housing and Enforcement Section,
Enforcement Overview, http://www.justice.gov/crt/housing/housing-main.php (last visited
Feb. 13, 2010).
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housing laws was significantly less aggressive than in prior years.
The Obama administration must reverse this trend and vigorously
enforce federal fair housing laws at both the administrative and
"pattern and practice '286 levels. Moreover, HUD should develop
guidance for grantees of federal housing assistance funds, as well as
for federal governmental agencies, clearly defining what must be
shown to meet the Fair Housing Act's requirement that the federal
government and the monies it disburses affirmatively further fair
housing.
287
6. Coordinating Legal and Policy Work on Integration Issues
The White House under the Obama administration may also
serve as a home to coordinate non-litigation, interagency strategies
that connect schools and housing. There are dozens of independently
operated federal education and housing programs that currently exist
to promote integration, either explicitly or implicitly. 288 Yet, even
though they are interrelated, they seem to function independently.
Moreover, policy leaders both within and outside of the federal
government have offered various cross-disciplinary proposals that
view access to various services or opportunities at a regional (rather
than local or municipal) level or that seek to achieve several different
community revitalization goals while also bringing together racially,
285. NAT'L COMM'N ON FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF
FAIR HOUSING 13-14, 22-24 (2008), http://nationalfairhousing.org/PublicPolicy/
FutureofFairHousingAbouttheCommission/tabid/3379/Default.aspx (click on "Entire
report in pdf format" hyperlink).
286. See § 3614(a) ("Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by [the Fair Housing Act].").
287. § 3608(e)(5) (establishing mandate that federal grantees must "affirmatively
further [fair housing]"); Exec. Order No. 12,892, 3 C.F.R. 849 (1995), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 3608 (2006) (requiring that federal agencies "affirmatively further fair housing in
[their] programs and activities" and establishing the President's Fair Housing Council); see
also United States ex rel. Antidiscrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 2860 (DLC), 2009 WL 455269, at *1-22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009)
(finding that Westchester County obtained approximately $52 million from the federal
government even though it "utterly failed" to meet its duty under the Fair Housing Act to
"affirmatively further fair housing").
288. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 7231-7321j (2006) (Magnet Schools Assistance Program); 26
U.S.C. § 42 (2006) (Low Income Housing Credit Program); 42. U.S.C. § 1437f (2006)
(Section 8 housing programs); Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6304 (2006)); Act of Dec.
16, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-186, § 203, 117 Stat. 2685, 2694 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437v (2006)) (Hope VI Housing Program).
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ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse communities. 9 Federal
executive leadership is needed, however, to implement these actions
through existing federal programs and to build better bridges across
the relevant federal agencies that oversee them. The White House,
perhaps through its Domestic Policy Council, can also work with
HUD, the Department of Education, the Department of
Transportation, the newly created Office of Urban Affairs, and other
federal (and state or local) agencies to develop new, proactive
policies and legislation that can go even further in addressing school
and housing issues comprehensively, and then, if necessary, champion
such proposals through Congress.2
Similar coordination can occur with regard to litigation within
DOJ. Certainly, if this administration substantially increases
enforcement of traditional fair housing and civil rights laws, that work
alone will go a great distance toward improving mobility for minority
families to live and work in more integrated communities. But, for
decades, civil rights lawyers have tried, mostly in vain, to pursue legal
theories and remedies that recognize the relationship between
housing discrimination and school segregation.291 The difficulty of
proving the necessary causal connection, however, has stymied many
of these efforts. Meanwhile, major attempts at the federal level to
289. See generally BREAKTHROUGH COMMUNITIES: SUSTAINABILITY AND JUSTICE IN
THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS (M. Palmona Pavel ed., 2009) (collecting essays and
proposals to discuss metropolitan-wide regional equity solutions that seek to address
housing, transportation, schools, and other issues at a regional level); PHILIP TEGELER,
SUSAN EATON & WESTRA MILLER, CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. & POVERTY
& RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, BRINGING CHILDREN TOGETHER: MAGNET
SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT 10-20 (2009),
http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/Publications/Item.aspx?id=100017 (Under "Event
Documents" click on "Full Report" hyperlink) (examining possibility of using Hope VI
housing program to promote racial and socioeconomic diversity in public schools located
in high poverty, high incarceration neighborhoods).
290. Some initial signs of such coordination on urban and metropolitan issues emerged
several months into the Obama presidency from the Office of Urban Affairs, which
purports to be working with other federal agencies to "change urban growth patterns and
foster opportunity, reduce sprawl, and jump-start the economy." Robin Shulman, New
White House to Redefine What Urban Policy Encompasses, WASH. POST, July 3, 2009, at
A6; Robin Shulman, White House to Push Forward on National Urban Policy Agenda,
WASH. POST, July 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
07/12/AR2009071200948.html.
291. See, e.g., Erin Nave, Note, Getting to the Roots of School Segregation: The
Challenges of Housing Remedies in Northern School Desegregation Litigation, 21 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 173, 174 (2009) ("Despite this close interrelationship between residential
segregation and the racial composition of northern schools, civil rights litigators have been




develop litigation combining those two critical areas occurred only
briefly in the late 1970s, 2g and while some good came out of it,
ultimately, the coordination did not endure.293 In addition to
traditional enforcement of fair housing and civil rights laws,
therefore, the Civil Rights Division under the Obama administration
should re-explore more inter-section work in order to attack the
complex barriers that stand in the way of equal opportunity for all
Americans. Doing so would entail forging relationships across the
Division's related practice areas and with other federal agencies to
develop innovative, cross-disciplinary litigation strategies.
Within the Division itself, one possible place to turn to forge the
necessary relationships and develop a cohesive strategy to combat
twenty-first century civil rights problems is the Coordination and
Review Section. Although that Section is among the Division's
smallest,294 its authority and unrealized potential is limitless. Tasked
to do everything from providing interagency coordination and
technical assistance to assuring efficient and effective civil rights
enforcement under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,295 the
Section should take a more proactive role in coordinating
comprehensive, interdisciplinary enforcement plans and convening
strategic planning conferences around key civil rights issues that span
292. Orfield, supra note 88, at 16 ("By the end of its term, however, the Carter
administration was trying to craft coordinated school and housing desegregation
policies."); The 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and Its Continuing
Importance Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 125 (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate-hearings&docid
=f:47679.pdf (testimony of Theodore M. Shaw, President, NAACP Legal Defense &
Education Fund) (referring to the General Litigation Section created during the Carter
administration "in recognition of the link between school and housing discrimination").
293. One brief exception might be the work of the Civil Rights Division under
President Carter, which combined the Division's education and housing sections and
ultimately filed the school case in Indianapolis that resulted in an order that included both
interdistrict relief and limited housing relief. United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of
Indianapolis, 456 F. Supp. 183, 191-92 (S.D. Ind. 1978), affd in part and vacated in part,
637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980).
294. AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF ALLEGED POLITICIZED HIRING AND
OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACrIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, supra note 150,
at 8 (showing number of lawyers in each section in chart form).
295. United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Coordination and
Review Section, http://www.justice.gov/crt/cor/purpose.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2010)
("The Civil Rights Division's Coordination and Review Section operates a
comprehensive, government-wide program of technical and legal assistance, training,
interagency coordination, and regulatory, policy, and program review, to assure that
federal agencies consistently and effectively enforce various landmark civil rights statutes
and related Executive Orders that prohibit discrimination in federally assisted programs
and in the federal government's own programs and activities.").
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across subject matter areas.296 The Coordination and Review Section
should work with the Division's other sections, as well as other
federal government partners, to expand the number of compliance
reviews under-and provide clearer, more effective guidance on-
Title VI's obligations. The role that the Section plays in this regard is
especially important given the inability of private parties to enforce
Title VI's disparate impact regulations. 97
Within OCR, that agency's new leadership should resume
compliance work that focuses on the continuing educational
disparities by race and ethnicity (without disregard to its other
responsibilities, of course). The agency's statutory authority to
investigate and make findings based on a disparate impact theory is
particularly valuable in this day and age for two reasons: first, as
already noted, unless there is a change to the law, private plaintiffs
are no longer able to bring such claims under Title VI,2 98 so they must
rely on federal enforcement by governmental entities like OCR.
Second, in education, as elsewhere, evidence of racial disparities
abounds, but proof of intentional discrimination is scant. Under Bush
II and undoubtedly long before, recipients of federal funds have been
operating in ways that perpetuate disparities with implicit approval by
the government. OCR must take steps to end this by investigating
gross disparities in areas such as graduation rates, 99 the mis-, under-,
and over-identification or placement of minority students with
learning disabilities,3" and zero tolerance policies and other forms of
student discipline.301 Some of the same kinds of relief that can be
extracted in court-ordered desegregation litigation can be obtained
through the proper exercise of OCR's enforcement powers under
296. One such conference was held in celebration of the 45th anniversary of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub.
Affairs, Justice Department Hosts Conference Celebrating the 45th Anniversary of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (July 20, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/
July/09-crt-704.html.
297. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
298. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
299. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, URBAN INST., EDUC. POL'Y CENTER, WHO
GRADUATES? WHO DOESN'T?: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATION, CLASS OF 2001, at 19-23 (2004), www.urban.org[UploadedPDF/410934
_WhoGraduates.pdf.
300. See generally RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (Daniel J. Losen &
Gary Orfield eds., 2002) (describing racial disparities in both the identification of children
with special needs and the provision of special education).
301. See, e.g., FLA. STATE CONFERENCE NAACP, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT &
NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., ARRESTING DEVELOPMENT: ADDRESSING




Title VI, so these cases can achieve critical racial justice results. In
conducting this work, OCR may choose to coordinate with lawyers
from the Educational Opportunities Section of DOJ's Civil Rights
Division, who would later accept referrals from OCR for litigation,
should OCR's administrative enforcement proceedings prove
insufficient.
7. Using Strategically the Civil Rights Commission's Charge and
Resources
Finally, there is the question of how to deal with the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights. For most of the past twenty-five years, it
has suffered from partisan wrangling. On both the Left and the Right,
many prominent voices have called for the Commission to be
dismantled and abolished, either because it no longer served a
meaningful purpose, or because it was no longer effective in pursuing
its mission." Because commissioners serve six-year terms, and six of
the eight members are either conservative Republicans or
"Independents,"3 °3 it may be a while before this President or
Congress can have much effect on the Commission's composition. It
is clear that the Commission no longer serves the same purpose that it
once did, and it is difficult to see how-given its current state-there
is much this administration could do in the near future to help to
restore the public's confidence in the Commission as a nonpartisan,
civil rights watchdog. Yet, it is also clear that the federal government
sorely needs a watchdog, regardless of whether the party in power
thinks it is favorable toward or aggressively opposed to civil rights.
And it is unlikely that any new entity that President Obama may
create to serve this function would have the kind of impact that the
Civil Rights Commission has had in the past, nor would such a
presidentially appointed commission likely have as many resources or
as much authority (e.g., subpoena power).3°4
302. See, e.g., Mary Frances Berry, Op-Ed, Gay but Equal?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009,
at A29; John H. Bunzel, Op-Ed, Eliminate the Civil Rights Commission, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
25, 2009, at G4; Linda Chavez, A Commission Without a Cause, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19,
2000, at A30; George F. Will, Op-Ed, Retire the Civil Rights Commission, PITTSBURGH
TRIB.-REV., Mar. 10, 2005, at 1; Bruce Fein, Visiting Fellow for Constitutional Studies,
The Heritage Foundation, Executive Memorandum 134, Time to Abolish the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission (Sept. 19, 1986), http://edgeweb.heritage.org/Research/
GovernmentReform/upload/91838_1.pdf.
303. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Commissioners, http://www.usccr.gov/cos/
cos.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (stating the party affiliation for each commissioner).
304. Consider, too, the relative ineffectiveness of Clinton's Advisory Board on Race.
See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
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The immediate impact that this administration can have on the
Commission, therefore, appears to be relatively limited. That said, a
March 2009 report from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
offers a series of reform recommendations that it argues would help
both to restore faith in the Commission as well as broaden its
mandate and authority. 5 All of these suggested reforms are
worthwhile, but they may also require the expenditure of substantial
political capital to execute. Short of making these kinds of changes, or
at least in the interim while the administration lobbies for them, there
may be another important function for the Commission to serve.
While it may not be possible for the Commission in its current
form to play a meaningful, active role in the monitoring and
development of civil rights law and policy, it can still serve the very
important function of data gathering. Although commissioners
choose which areas of civil rights to investigate, and they are actively
involved in conducting hearings and developing the findings and
recommendations that emerge from the reports produced, they are
not the ones who collect and analyze the data in the first instance. A
great deal of that work is conducted by the career staff, the six
regional offices, and the fifty-one state advisory committees which are
"composed of citizens familiar with local and state civil rights
issues. ' Thus, even where the findings and recommendations may
be ideologically driven, the data and much of the substantive content
of the Commission's reports can still be useful to advocates and to
other government agencies as well.3 7 Perhaps the best interim
solution, then, is for the administration to recommend to the Civil
Rights Commission areas where additional information or data
gathering is needed, and the Commission can serve the relatively
neutral function of collecting and making such information more
accessible. In 2010 at least two of the commissioners' terms will
expire,3 and at that point, additional thought can be given to how a
305. RESTORING THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION, supra note 119, at 43-45.
306. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, State Advisory Committees,
http://www.usccr.gov/ (click on "State Advisory Committees" hyperlink).
307. The Civil Rights Commission's recent report, BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?, supra
note 204, is a good example. Regardless of whether one agrees with its findings and
recommendations, the report provides a great deal of information that otherwise may not
have been accessible to most Americans, and probably not easily accessible even within
the government.
308. The commissioners serve staggered six-year terms. Thus, the terms of two
commissioners appointed in 2004-Gerald Reynolds and Ashley Taylor-are set to expire
in 2010. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, http://www.usccr.gov/ (click on
"Commissioners" hyperlink; click on the "Gerald Reynolds" and "Ashley Taylor"
hyperlinks for bios stating they were appointed in 2004) (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
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reconstituted Commission could, once again, become a leader in the
fight for civil rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes that the federal government both use its
existing tools and create new opportunities to promote integration
and equity. First, to capture what gains can be obtained from school
desegregation cases that remain under court order or subject to
administrative agreements, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, together with the Office for Civil Rights of the
U.S. Department of Education, should develop a clear, proactive
strategy to revisit all of the cases on its dockets. Virtually all of the
communities that remain beholden to court orders and administrative
agreements are vastly different-in size, in demographics, and in
culture-today than they were when the orders or agreements that
technically govern them were first issued. Accordingly, whatever
guidance OCR and/or DOJ develop to inform their work here should
take account of the current realities of the communities in question,
while emphasizing sustainable, integration- and equity-maximizing
results, within the limits of the law.
Second, recognizing the limitations of school desegregation
litigation, the White House must also provide leadership in the
development of an affirmative school integration strategy that
involves not just the usual suspects but also those who all too often
have been left out of the conversation-housing officials,
transportation officials, urban and metropolitan policy officials, and
others. The federal agencies that administer programs with
integration and equity implications should give serious consideration
to how the programs can operate, separately and together, to reduce
rather than exacerbate racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities.
Meanwhile, DOJ and OCR must ramp up their enforcement of key
civil rights laws and revise guidance to encourage state and local
officials to adopt their own integration measures voluntarily. Finally,
to establish public support for these interagency efforts, the
Department of Education can and should lead an effort to develop a
strong body of research on the continuing importance of and
necessary resources to attain sustainable, racially integrated public
schools.
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